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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the principal objectives of United States foreign 
policy in Asia since 1950 has been the containment of any 
further spread of Communist influence in the region. Con-
tainment had its origins in Europe and can be seen in the 
Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. In Asia, containment has involved the 
United States in military conflict in Korea, Vietnam, and 
more recently in Cambodia. In addition bilateral and multi-
lateral alliances have been negotiated with a view to pre-
venting the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union 
from expanding their political influence over the states 
along the Communist perimeter, considered to be vital to the 
interest of the United States. 
In South Korea, where the government was relatively 
stable, resistance to the North Korean invasion of 1950 was 
primarily in conventional military terms. South Vietnam 
presents a much more complex problem. Not only has the Uni-
ted States been involved in military conflict in North Viet-
narn, but it has confronted a formidable guerrilla force sup-
1 
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ported by the North Vietnamese. This force seeks to replace 
the weak and narrow based government in Saigon. The military 
conflict has been unconventional in terms of United States 
experience, and it has been costly in American lives and 
materials. Maintaining a viable government in Saigon has 
been a problem that was not experienced in Korea. Thus, from 
both a military and political standpoint, the United States 
has been confronted over the years with a costly and complex 
engagement. With each phase of the developing military con-
flict and with each fall of a Saigon government, the United 
States has experienced an increase in its involvement. 
An understanding of the increasing commitment exper-
ienced by the United States requires a historical analysis. 
Initially theindo-Chinesewar was regarded as primarily a 
conflict between a colonial power and nationalist political 
forces. The United States did not desire to become involved 
in this kind of war. However, with the demise of the Nation-
alist regime in China in 1949 and the coming to power of the 
Communist Party, the situation in Southeast Asia became more 
ominous for the United States. The Communist regime in China 
appeared to the United States to be a major threat to its 
vital security interest in the region. Assistance in large 
quantities was given to the French in order to help sustain 
their position against the Viet Minh which was supported by 
the Chinese Communists. 
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With the defeat of the French in Indo-China in 1954 and 
the settlement at Geneva which permitted the French to with-
draw, the United States gave assistance to the Diem regime 
directly. In effect, it replaced the French in South Viet-
nam and supported Diem's struggle against the Communists. 
Economic, technibal, and military assistance not only con-
tinued but was eventually augmented with a large number of 
military advisers. By 1965, the United States' position had 
evolved from that of supplier of material assistance and ad-
visers to one of complete and direct military involvement. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the process by which 
the United States became a full military participant in the 
Vietnamese war ~nd the sustaining power in support of the 
Vietnamese government. 
It is assumed that South Vietnam was considered to be 
vital to the Un~ted States' defense perimeter in Asia because 
of its location in the east-west air and sea lanes between 
Asia and Europe. In addition, South Vietnam under Communist 
control was viewed as a convenient stepping-stone to further 
political and.military conquest of surrounding areas which 
would directly interfere with the position of the United 
States in the Pacific. In terms of these considerations the 
United States decided in 1950 to assist the French in hopes 
that they could maintain a dominant position in the region. 
But after 1954, when the French were defeated, it was decided 
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that support should be given to the Diem Regime, which was 
believed to have some nationalist appeal and a chance to be-
come a viable and legitimate government. Perhaps the weak-
ness of this regime and the complexity of the environment 
were not fully understood; or perhaps if they were under-
stood, there was some hope that a viable government could be 
developed and that it was necessary to risk an entangling 
involvement. 
The United States initially anticipated only a limited 
commitment of aid and advice to the Diem government~ but the 
weakness of this government and the intensity of the military 
effort of the South Vietnamese Communists compelled the Uni-
ted States leadership to gradually shift from a policy of 
aid and advice to a complete military and political commit-
ment in South Vietnam. This commitment has forced the Uni-
ted States to provide the leadership in the military contest 
and to determine the form of the political order in South 
Vietnam, including the selection of political leadership. 
This also implies, and this study seeks to confirm, that the 
question of the United States' commitment to the defense of 
the South Vietnamese regime is closely linked to the broad-
er "containment-of-Communism" policy in Asia and the Pacific 
area. 
This study attempts to identify the stages that charact-
erized the evolution of the military and political commitment 
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in South Vie~nam, once a general commitment to the Southeast 
Asian area was made. Perhaps the extent of the eventual com-
mitment was not originally anticipated. A question of con-
siderable importance is whether the full commitment which 
was finally made has served the best interests of the United 
States in Southeast Asia. How does a limited political and 
military commitment in support of a foreign regime force a 
large power to escalate its involvement in order to legiti-
mize its origin~l commitment? This research should provide 
a background for further investigation of United States in-
volvement in other areas of political instability. The meth-
odology employed in the preparation of this thesis is des-
criptive-analytical. 
Chapter one presents a historical perspective of the 
problem. This will include a broad analytical description 
of United States foreign policy objectives in Asia since 
1950. 
Chapter two discusses why the United States believed it 
necessary to commit itself to the maintenance of the Diem 
regime after the demise of the French position in Vietnam 
and the Geneva Conference. 
The third chapter provides a detailed presentation of 
the progression of this commitment to the Diem regime in the 
years from 1954 to 1963. The emphasis of this chapter will 
be on the critical internal and external problems confront-
6 
ing South Vietnam. 
Finally, the fourth chapter discusses South Vietnam's 
inability to cope with its problems without vast amounts of 
economic aid and military assistance from the United States 
and how this led the United States to a full military commit-
ment including the maintenance of political order in Saigon. 
The data and source material consist of primary sources 
in the form of documents relating to alliances, international 
conferences, and statements and pronouncements of the various 
parties concerned. The specific documents used are mainly 
found in published collections of documents. Extensive use 
was made of United States Government document sources. Arti-
cles in professional journals were particularly helpful on 
specific problems not thoroughly discussed in comprehensive 
works. An invaluable source was the New York Times. 
CHAPTER II 
THE UNITED STATES AND INDO-CHINA 1945 - 1954 
Since World War II the United States has been extremely 
sensitive to political developments threatening the status 
quo in areas considered vital to its security interests. Of 
particular concern has been the threatened rise to power of 
Communist leaderships in the countries of these areas. Re-
sistance to these developments has required the expenditure 
of considerable energy and resources. Large amounts of eco-
nomic and military aid have been dispatched to friends and 
allies who have been willing to share the burden, and a 
world-wide system of military alliances has been created to 
check the military expansion of the adversary powers. These 
developments have been a manifestation of the United States 
policy of containment originally enunciated in 1947 in re-
sponse to the Soviet Unions' challenge in Europe and later 
extepded to Asia. George F. Kennan, who has provided a viv-
id expression of this policy, wrote: 
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in 
the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy 
with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard 
the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the 
political arena. It must continue to expect that 
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Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of 
peace and stability, no real faith in the possi-
bility of a permanent happy coexistence of the 
Socialist and Capitalist worlds, but rather a 
cautious, persistent pressure toward the disrup-
tion and weakening of all rival influence and 
rival power. 
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, 
as opposed to the western world in general, is 
still by far the weaker party, that Soviet society 
may well contain deficiencies which will eventually 
weaken its own total potential. This would itself 
warrant the United States entering with reasonable 
confidence upon a policy of firm containment, de-
signed to confront the Russians with unalterable 
counter-force at every point where they show signs 
of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and 
stable world. 1 
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At mid-century, when the United States had adjusted in 
some measure to the Soviet challenge in Europe, it found that 
postwar events in the Far East had frustrated its effort to 
create a stable Orient around the China of Chiang Kai-shek. 
With the establishment of the Communist People's Republic of 
Chin~ and the fear that Peking would forcefully extend its 
boundaries and influence in the Far East, the United States 
took the lead in an effort to provide a deterrent. Southeast 
Asia soon became a focal point of United States' concern in 
this rivalry. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson's speech in Washington, 
January 12, 1950, comprised an overall statement of United 
1 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chi-
cago, 1951), p. 104. 
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States Far Eastern policy for the time. The Secretary very 
carefully de£ined the nation's defense perimeter in the Far 
East, put went on to say there were other problems confront-
ing Asia which were incapable of being solved by military 
.means. The Secretary stated: 
.This defensive.perimeter runs along the Aleutians 
. to .Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus, then runs 
.from theRyukyus to the Philippine Islands. So 
fa.r as the .military.security.of other .areas in the 
.Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no. per-
son can.guarantee these areas against military at-
tack. But it is amistake, I think, in consider-
ing Pacific. and Far Eastern .. problems to become ob-
. sessed .. with military .considerations. Important as 
they are,. there are other problen;ts that press, and 
.these other problems. ar.e not capable of solution 
through.military means. These other problems arise 
out of susceptibility of many areas, and many coun-
tries in the Pacific area, to subversion and pene- 2 
tration. That cannot be stopped by military means. 
This statement suggested the limits of the United 
States military commitment in Asia and pointed to "soft" 
spots where it was considered that military means could not 
be relied on primarily. Unfortunately the statement was 
vague in reference to what the United States considered to 
be its interests beyond the military defensive perimeter. 
By June of 1950 North Korea had crossed the 38th paral-
lel, invading South Korea, a country outside the announced 
2united States ·Department of State. The Department of 
State Bulletin. Washington: United States Government Print-
ing Office, XXII, January 23, 1950, p. 111. Hereafter cited 
as Bulletin. 
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defensive perimeter. The United States responded militarily 
despite Secretary Acheson's January statement. To United 
States' leadership this invasion was nothing less than the 
beginning of a general Communist assault on the 11 free 11 world. 
"The attack upon the Republic of Korea," President Truman 
warned the nation, "makes it plain beyond all doubt that the 
international Communist movement is prepared to use armed 
invasion to conquer independent nations. 113 The Soviet Union 
was accused of encouraging the attack. If aggression sue-
I 
ceeded in Korea, so the argument ran, it would be repeated 
elsewhere until it rendered a third world war unavoidable. 
The Korean War also caused the United States to take a more 
active interest in Southeast Asia. To prevent attacks in 
this area, the President increased military assistance to the 
Philippines and to the French in Indo-China and ordered the 
Seventh Fleet to patrol the waters between mainland China 
and Formosa. 
China's entry into the Korean War in November, 1950, 
was used by the Administration to support the argument that 
the Communist threat of aggression was world-wide. But, not 
until the Korean War demonstrated the strength of mainland 
China did United States leadership accept the necessity of 
building ap alliance system that would cover all of ~he F~r 
3Bulletin, XXIII, July 3, 1950, p. 5. · 
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East. In August and September, 1951, the Truman administra-
tion negotiated mutual defense treaties with the Philippines, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Also in September, 1951, it 
signed a similar pact with Japan, which gave the United 
States the right to maintain land, air, and naval forces in 
and about Japan. 
The danger, according to United States leadership, rest-
ed in the ability of Communist agitators to aggravate the 
nationalist aspirations of people so that they would rebel 
violently against the existing order. Before a new stability 
could be created, it was believed, the Communists would gain 
control of the State and convey it into the Soviet orbit. 
So pronounced became this interpretation of pressures against 
the status quo in Asia, that nationalism was discounted and 
the Communists were credited with stimulating all revolution-
ary action against governments friendly to the West. Thus, 
the United States made a commitment to preserve the status 
quo, and to work toward limiting change in the Far Eastern 
area to a peaceful and gradual process. There seemed to be 
no choice but to place its emphasis on military means to pre-
vent change that would be detrimental to its interests, but 
the Korean War remain€d an isolated example of traditional 
military aggression. Elsewhere the pressures for change, 
whether Communist-led or not, responded to indigenous politi-
cal conditions and took the form of revolutions. 
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The situation in Indo-China demonstrated the truth of 
Secretary Acheson's appraisal of conditions in Asia. The 
strength of the revolutionary forces which were confronting 
the French lay not in the fact that their leader, Ho Chi 
Minh, was a Communist, but sprang from the nationalist fer-
vor of the people and their general desire to rid the coun-
1 
try of French rule. Above all, it demonstrated that revolu-
tionary c'j:lange could not be prevented by military means. 
But the fact that Ho Chi Minh was a Communist convinced the 
United St~tes leadership that this was not a civil war, but 
Communist aggression directed by China and the Soviet Union. 
United States leadership, therefore, being fully con-
vinced th~t most change in Asia was due to Communist pres-
sure and influence, began constructing its Asian policy 
I 
around a series of alliances aimed at the containment of 
Cornqiunist states. In addition to the earlier pacts the 
United States had signed with Japan, the Philippines, Aus-
tr·alia, and New Zealand in the late summer and fall of 1951, 
the United States entered into a mutual defense treaty with 
the Republic of Korea in October, 1953. 4 As will be develop-
ed iater in this study, United States leadership in general, 
and Secretary Dulles in particular, believed that the West 
4Richard P. Stebbins, ed., Documents .Q!l American For-
eign Relations, 1~53 (New York, 1954), pp. 312-313. Here-
after cited as Documents. 
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had suffered a severe diplomatic defeat at the Geneva Confer-
ence in the summer of 1954. Believing that further Communist 
aggression in Southeast Asia was now only a question of time, 
United States leadership believed that what was needed was 
some sort of an alliance system for the area. The result 
was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which was nego-
tiated in September of 1954. 5 The treaty was to become a 
basic instrument of United States policy in Southeast Asia. 
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was comprised 
of the United States, England, France, Australia, New Zea-
land, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. 6 These 
5Ibid., 1954, pp. 319-323. Actually, Secretary Dulles 
had proposed a formal alliance prior to the Geneva Confer-
ence. ''The Threat of a Red Asia," Address by Secretary 
Dulles, Bulletin, XXX, April 12, 1954, p. 540. According to 
Russell H. Fifield: "The conflict in Indo-China proved an 
obstacle to such action, for a number of prospective parti-
cipants viewed a multilateral security pact or "united ac-
tion" under the circumstances as a means of involvement in 
war rather than a deterrent to it. The United States be-
lieved a security treaty would strengthen the West in the 
coming negotiations with the Communists on Indo-China, but 
Great Britain was convinced that such a pact should await 
the outcome of the Geneva Conference." Russel H. Fifield, 
Southeast~ in United States Policy (New York, 1963), 
p. 27. 
6 South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia were not parties to the 
Treaty, but they were included in the area covered by the 
defense and economic provision in a protocol to the Treaty. 
Laos was removed from coverage under the Treaty as a result 
of the Geneva Conference in 1962 which neutralized it, and 
Cambodia later voluntarily withdrew. 
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eight nations agreed to act jointly in any situation which 
might endanger the peace of the 11 area 11 south of Taiwan. 
India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia's refusal to join limited 
its military value. In fact, the pact required little of its 
Asian members except that they resist what was understood to 
be "Communist aggression." In return for this, the United 
States would provide economic, political and military sup-
port. Common action under the treaty, however, could be 
difficult to achieve since each member state reserved the 
right, in the wording of the treaty, to make the response it 
deemed necessary in each situation. With the negotiation of 
a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan 
in December, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles completed the 
United States alliance system in the Far East. 
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was intended to 
be the backbone of the United States' defense structure in 
Southeast Asia. However, Secretary Dulles made it plain 
that the United States would not permanently maintain forces 
in particular countries of the region for the purpose of 
deterring aggression, but would develop mobile striking power 
that could respond when needed. He said at the Manila Con-
ference: 
••• the responsibilities of the United States 
are so vast and farflung that we believe we 
would serve best not by earmarking forces for 
particular areas of the Far East but by develop-
ing the deterrent of mobile striking power plus 
7 
strategically placed reserves. 
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization actually had 
8 little real strength. The Asian members possessed only 
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conventional weapons and in those terms were militarily weak. 
European members were withdrawing from the region and real-
istically could not be depended upon to make major contribu-
tions. Also, during this period the United States defense 
strategy was based upon 11 massive retaliation" against a maj-
or aggressor, and limited attention was given to the pros-
pects of fighting a localized war. In view of these factors 
the SEATO arrangement merely provided boundaries within which 
the United States was concerned that the status quo be pre-
served. The burden for maintaining the status quo during 
this period of change realistically rested upon the United 
States. Its leadership, however, hoped that direct military 
involvement could be avoided by extending aid to the weak 
governments in the region and by using the nuclear threat 
against any large power aggression. In a ten year period 
beginning in 1945, United States policy in the Far East and 
United States policies toward Indo-China in particular had 
7Bulletin, XXXI, September 20, 1954, p. 391. 
8 C. L. Sulzberger, 11 The Loss of Options in Vietnam, 11 
New York Times, January 11, 1965, p. 44. This author des-
cribed the alliance system constructed by Secretary Dulles 
as 11 valueless 11 • 
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evolved from reliance upon major European powers in the re-
gion to one in which the United States was the principal 
protector. The questions this study now turns to are as 
follows: What were the reasons and the process by which 
United States policies toward Indo-China made this transi-
tion? How did United States policy evolve from one of rela-
tive non-ipterest in the area in 1945, to one of a unilateral 
military commitment to defend the states of the area against 
what United States leadership termed "Communist aggression" 
in 1954? 
The Evolution of United States Policies 
Toward Indo-China 1945-1954 
Throughout the Second World War, the Free French fre-
quently asserted their intention to return to Indo-China 
after the War. However, the French Cabinet on March 24, 
1945, announced that Indo-China would have a "new" political 
status within the French community. France, it was said, 
had always believed that Indo-China deserved a special posi-
tion within the French community. However, there seems to 
have been several motives behind this new plan. The Japan-
ese had offered Indo-China her independence after the War; 
so the French offer was made partly to counteract this. In 
the background, however, the French leadership feared the 
possibility that Indo-China might be placed in an interna-
17 
tional trusteeship after the war. The French leadership knew 
that both Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
did not oppose this idea and that President Roosevelt was 
highly in favor of it. Roosevelt, they knew, blamed France 
for allowing Indo-China to become the springboard for Japan's 
attack on the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. 
If the idea of placing Indo-China under an international 
trusteeship had not been so vigorously opposed by Prime Min-
ister Winston Churchill, the plan might have been implernent-
ed. 9 · 
9 At a press conference held aboard the u.s.s. Quincy on 
February 23, 1945, en route to Yalta, Roosevelt said: "For 
two whole years I have been terribly worried about Indo-
China. I talked to .Chiang .Kai-shek in .Cairo (Nov., 1943) 
and Stal.in in Teheran. They both agreed with me .... The 
£irst thing .I asked Chiang was, 'Do you :want Indo-China?' 
He .said, "It's no help to us. We don't want it. They are 
not.Chinese. They would not assimilate into the Chinese 
peopJ.e." I. said, . 'What are you going to advocate? It will 
take a long time to educate them for self-government.' He 
said. they should not go back to France, that they have been 
there over a hundred years and have done nothing about edu-
cating them, that for every dollar they have put in, they 
have taken out ten, ·and that the situation is a good deal 
like the Philippines were in 1898 .... I suggested at the time 
to .Chiang., that .Indo-China be set up under a trusteeship--
have a Frenchman, one or two Indo-Chinese, and a Chinese and 
a Russi.an,. be.cause they .are on the coa,st, and maybe a Fili-
-pina-,,and--an. Americ.an,. to educate. them for se.lf-government .... 
Stalin liked the idea. China liked the idea. The British 
didn't like it. It.might bust up their empire, because if 
the Indo-Chinese were to work together and eventua.lly g.et 
their independence,'.the Burmese might do the same thing to 
England. The. French.have talked about how they expect to 
recapture Indo~China, but they haven't got any shipping to 
do it with. It would only get the British mad. Chiang 
would go along. Stalin would go along. As for the British, 
18 
Because of Churchill's opposition, by the spring of 
1945, United States leadership had apparently ruled out the 
possibility of any major interference with the French posi-
tion in Indo-China. However, the United States continued to 
be critical of the French intention to return to Indo-China. 
The French were suspicious that the United States was inter-
ested in the region for itself and were annoyed by the pre-
sence of the Office of Strategic Services in Indo-China. 
Major Patti who was in charge of the Off ice of Strategic Ser-
vices in Hanoi seemed to the French to be unusually anti-
French. The Office of Strategic Services was looked upon as 
the vanguard of American imperialism in Indo-China. 10 
The March 24, 1945 plan, despite its high-sounding 
phraseology, called for the re-establishment of French hege-
mony in Indo-China after the Japanese forces had been defeat-
ed and forced to evacuate the area. The most vigorous oppo-
it would only make the British mad. Better to keep quiet 
just now. 11 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., :I.he. Public Papers ~ 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45 (New York, 1950), 
pp. 562-563. 
10According to a French report, OSS agents went so far 
as to propose to Ho Chi Minh that economic interests with 
which General William Donovan, OSS Chief, was associated, 
would help reconstruct Vietnamese railroads, .roads, and air-
fields, in exchange for economic privileges :in the region. 
Ho, accordipg to this French account, rejected the offer. 
Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indo-China (Stanford, 
1954), p. 130n. 
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sition to this plan came from Vietnamese leadership itself. 
In a message to General de Gaulle, the Vietnamese Emperor 
Bao Dai wrote: 
You 'WOuld understand better if you could see what 
is happening here, if you could feel this desire 
for independence which is in everyone's heart and 
which no human force can any longer restrain. Even 
if you come to.re-establish a French administra-
tion here, it will no longer be obeyed: each 
village will be a nest of resistance; each former 
collaborator an enemy, and your officials and 
colonists will themselves ask to leave this at-11 
mosphere which they will be unable to breath. 
Leading the opposition, however, at this time, not only 
to the re-establishment of French hegemony, but also to Bao 
Dai himself, was a thin, wisp of 'a man by the name of Ho Chi 
M . h 12 in . The Viet Minh had fought the Japanese, and after 
the War, Ho Chi Minh was able to establish his forces in 
northern Vietnam. 13 In 1945, the Bao Dai regime at Hue was 
too weak to cope with the Viet Minh, and on August 26, 1945, 
11Ibid., p. 102. 
12Ho Chi Minh (He Who Enlightens) was born Nguyen Tat 
Thanh, May lQ, 1890, in the central Vietnamese village of 
Hatinh. He WE;!nt to Paris in 1911 to agitate.against the 
French tor Vietnamese independence. He studied Communist 
techniques in Moscow from 1923 to 1925. He founded the Indo-
Chinese Corrununist Party in 1930. He formed the Viet Minh 
(full name: Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh Loa - League for the 
Independence of Vietnam) on May l~, 1941. He adopted the 
name Ho Chi Minh in 1943. 
13Hue was the old Imperial city, 400 miles north of 
Saigon. It was the traditional City of the Emperors. 
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the Emperor abdicated in favor of Ho. Ho Chi Minh declared 
the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 
September 2, 1945. The Capitol was moved to Hanoi, and after 
seventy-five years of foreign domination, first under the 
French cp.nd thFin the Japanese, Vietnam was free and united. 
General Leclerc began the reconquest of Indo-China for 
France on October 25, 1945. By January, 1946, French troops 
had recaptured most of the cities of Cochin China, and the 
rich rubber plantations. By February, 1946, most of the 
Viet Minh leaders had been forced to flee to Hanoi. French 
leadership, on March 7, 1946, recognized the automony of the 
'Viet Minh regime in the North with Ho Chi Minh as President. 
However, Ho Chi Minh, in a campaign to win all of Vietnam, 
kept guerrilla pressure on the French troops until full-scale 
war broke out between the two protagonists on December 19, 
1946. This date marks the beginning of the first Indo-
Chinese War, 9 war, which initially attracted very little 
attention. In fact, there was very little international in-
terest i:p. Indo-China in 1946 and 1947. This included the 
14 United States. 
14Indonesia seemed to United States policy-makers to 
offer far better reasons for intervention than Vietnam. For 
one thing, both Americans and Englishmen had substantial in-
vestments in Indonesia, while Indo-China was almost exclu-
sively a French economic preserve. Also, because of her 
tradition of anti-colonialism, United Stated leadership was 
hesitant to play the role of assisting a colonial power 
21 
The United States did have a real interest in France, 
however, which United States policy-makers considered to be 
a key nation to the defense and recovery of Western Europe. 
The French argued that, if they lost Vietnam, it would lead 
to the loss of most of their empire and would have disastrous 
economic and military repercussions in France. When this 
argument was added to the fact that the Communists played a 
key role in the Vietnamese resistance, the United States 
Government ceased being so openly critical of French policy 
in Indo-China. The United States contented itself, however, 
by simply expressing a desire for peace in Vietnam. In Feb-
ruary, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall said that 
he hoped "a pacific basis of adjustment of the difficulties 
15 
could be found. " 
Despite early French victories on the battlefield, it 
soon became app~rent to French leadership that its objectives 
in Vietnam could not be accomplished by military means alone. 
It was then that the proposal was made to return Bao Dai to 
his throne. Bao . . h d b Arn . 16 d Dai, it was ope y ericans an French 
regain her empire. 
15New XQ.r]£ Times, February 8, 1947, p. 2. 
16w.illiarn c. Bullitt, "The Saddest War," Life, December 
29, 1947, pp. 64-69. 
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alike, still had enough influence in Vietnam to win over 
many of Ho Chi Minh's supporters. William C. Bullitt, Uni-
ted States Ambassador to France during World War II, had 
visited ;Indo-China in the fall of 1947 and had talked to the 
former Emperor in Hong Kong. Evidently, Bullitt had persuad-
ed United States leadership to consider the merits of return-
,ing Bao Dai to his throne to counteract the popularity of 
Ho Chi Minh. With the arrival of the Chinese Communists on 
the Vietnamese border by the winter of 1948-1949, the French 
position in Indo-China became critical. The dimensions of 
the problem changed considerably, for Ho Chi Minh would soon 
have a powerful ally close at hand. It was proposed with 
some urgency by the French government that Bao Dai be return-
ed to his throne in the hope that he could provide an alter-
native to Ho Chi Minh. 
After a great deal of persuasion, the Emperor Bao Dai 
agreed to return to Vietnam as Emperor, and as head of Gov-
ernment. The Elysee Accords, by which the Emperor agreed to 
return, were signed by Bao Dai and Vincent Auriol, President 
of France, on March 8, 1949, at the Elysee Palace in Paris!7 
17By the provisions of the Elysee Agreements signed in 
Paris on March 8, 1949, Vietnam officially joined the French 
Union as an Associated State. F'rance promised to support a 
Vietnamese application for membership in the United Nations. 
However, this did not mean that Vietnam was independent or 
even close to it. France still had control of Vietnam's for-
eign and military affairs. Cochin China became a part of 
23 
In June, 1949, the new unified state of Vietnam was fonned, 
under the leadership of Bao Dai. The Department of State 
issued a statement saying that the United States hoped "for 
the progressive realization of the legitimate aspirations of 
18 the Vietnamese people." 
When the Ho Chi Minh government sought recognition early 
in 1950, the Communist People's Republic of China and the 
Soviet Union immediately recognized the Northern regime. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson issued a statement saying 
that this "should remove any illusion as to the nationalist 
character of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals him in his true 
colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indo-
Ch . ..19 ina. For the French this served to overcome initial 
reluctance of the United States to come to the assistance of 
a colonial power. United States leadership now interpreted 
the conflict as an integral part of the international power 
struggle between the East and West. If the Communists won 
in Vietnam, so the thinking went, they would have an entree 
into the "soft underbelly" of the Asian continent. In turn, 
this would endanger the United States' vital security inter-
the new Associated State of Vietnam. 
18Bulletin, XXJ:, July 18, 1949, p. 75. 
19rbid., XXII, February 13, 1950, p. 244. 
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ests throughout the Pacific area. The French government, of 
course, was aware of this change in thinking on the part of the 
leadership of the United States and took advantage of it to 
secure aid. 
The Bao Dai government owed its existence to the Elysee 
Agreements which had been signed in Paris on March 8, 1949, 
but these agreements were not immediately ratified by the 
French Assembly. The Assembly ratified them on February 2, 
1950, after being told by the government that ratification 
was a prerequisite to economic assistance from the United 
20 States. On February 7, both the United States and ~reat 
Britain extended recognition to the Bao Dai government. 
Later that month, the French government put in a formal re-
quest to the United States for military and economic aid to 
Indo-China. France had been insisting for some time that 
Indo-China had become an international responsibility and a 
problem that should be dealt with by all of the large powers. 
The aid was granted to France in the spring of 1950~~ 21 Al-
though France insisted that all military aid be sent directly 
to her, military aid was also granted to the three Indo-
20 Ellen J. Hammer, "Genesis of the First Indo-Chinese 
War," Vietnam, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman (Greenwd.ch, Conn., 
1965) I P• 80. 
21Bulletin, XX:II, May 22, 1950, p. 821. 
25 
h . 22 c inese states. However, most of the aid went to the Bao 
Dai regime in Vietnam. United States leadership believed 
that it must sustain this regime in order to enable it to 
rally around itself the nationalists who were then in Ho Chi 
Minh's camp. The United States made it clear that it was 
not supporting France as a colonial power and the only rea-
son it granted the aid was to "enable Indo-China to emerge 
from colonial status into real independence. 1123 The leader-
ship of the United States declared it did not intend to as-
sume the major burden of defending Indo-China. French lead-
ership, at this time, was talking of United States aid in 
terms of hundreds of millions of dollars. 24 This aid, grant-
ed in the spring of 1950, was the beginning of the United 
States financial commitment to South Vietnam. 25 
22vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Most of the $75,000,000 
at President Truman's disposal until June 30, 1950, under 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, was to be granted to 
Indo-China, and this was to be primarily for military equip-
ment. Further aid after that date would have to be voted by 
Congress. Transportation and communications equipment, in-
cluding aircraft, was high on the list of material to be 
sent to Indo-China. 
23 k ' M 9 1950 3 New XQL_ Times, ay , , p. . 
24 b'd 1 I l ., p. . 
25senator J. William Fulbright, ed., The Vietnam Hear-
ings (New York, 1966), p. 9. 
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The Emperor, Bao Dai, returned to Vietnam after the 
French National Assembly ratified the Elysee Accords to find 
himself in what amounted to a political vacuum. It did not 
take the Vietnamese long to see Bao Dai for what he really 
was, a puppet of the French colonialists. No one was more 
aware of the weakness of his position than Bao Dai himself, 
and in January, 1950, he resigned as Prime Minister. His 
successor, Nguyen Phan Long, tried to win over members of the 
resistance, but had little success. No sooner was he in 
office than he appealed for United States military and econ-
omic aid to be granted directly to Vietnam without being 
routed through French intermediaries, and he made no secret 
of his desire to develop a Vietnamese army. He asked the 
United States to give him some $146,000,000 for economic 
reconstruction and for a national army. With this aid he 
felt that Ho Chi Minh could be defeated within six months. 
United States leadership refused to grant him this aid, but 
Long's pro-American policy antagonized the French adminis-
tration, and when French officials directed Bao Dai to dis.:.: 
miss him the Emperor did so in May, 1950. In 1953, on the 
basis of military plans drawn up by General Henri-Eugene 
Navarre and a French pledge to intensify the prosecution of 
the war and make "every effort to break up and destroy enemy 
forces in Inda-China," the United States promised France an 
27 
additional $385 million. 26 This was the Navarre Plan, which 
the United States financed, and which called for French re-
inforcements and for the training of native troops. 
In the Vietnamese Thai country near the Laotian border 
was located what was considered to be the key point of the 
entire French military position in Indo-China. This was the 
French jungle fortress at Dienbeinphu. By January, 1954, 
the entire region was heavily beseiged by the Viet Minh. 
The French immediately requested that the United States send 
27 them four hundred airplane mechanics and maintenance men. 
The United States finally sent two hundred, and this caused 
some concern in the United States that it might be the pre-
lude to a large-scale commitment of United States forces in 
Indo-China; President Eisenhower in his message to the Con-
28 gress, January 7, 1954, assured Congress that it would not. 
On March 20, 1954, General Paul Ely, the French Chief 
of Staff, arrived in Washington and informed President Eis-
enhower, Secretary of State Dulles, and Admiral Radford29 
26Bulletin, XXIX, October 12, 1953, p. 487. 
27 New York Herald Tribune, January 27, 1954, p. 7. 
28Bulletin, XXX, January 18, 1954, pp. 75-79. 
29chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
28 
that unless the United States intervened at Dienbienphu, the 
fortress would fall to the Viet Minh and the war would be 
lost. 30 According to Chalmers M. Roberts, General Ely's 
remarks initiated a tense _struggle within the National Se-
curity Council. Admiral Radford favored intervention and 
was supported by Secretary Dulles and Vice-President Richard 
Nixon. According to the Roberts' account, Secretary of State 
Dulles, Admiral Radford, Under-Secretary of Defense Roger 
Kyes, Navy Secretary Robert B. Anderson, and Thruston B. 
Morton, (Dulles' assistant for Congressional Relations), 
met with several leaders in both houses of the Congress on 
April 3, 1954. 31 Secretary Dulles evidently had called the 
meeting in order to secure a joint resolution from Congress 
supporting the President in the employment of air and naval 
power in Indo-China, if the President believed that it was 
needed to rescue the French at Dienbienphu. Upon hearing 
from Admiral Radford that the other members of the Joint 
30 Chalmers M. Roberts, 11 The Day We Didn't Go To War, 11 
The Reporter, XI, (September 14, 1954), 31-35. 
31There were eight legi"slators present at this meeting: 
Senate Majority Leader William Knowland, Senate Minority 
Leader Lyndon Johnson, and Senators Eugene Millikin, Richard 
B. Russel and Earle C. Clements. From the House, there was 
Speaker Joseph Martin, John W. McCormack and J. Percy Priest. 
29 
Chiefs of Staff were not in agreement with him, 32 and learn-
ing that Secretary Dulles had not contacted any of the 
Allies to see if they would support the United States if it 
did decide to intervene, the Congressmen were all in agree-
ment that Dulles had better consult with the Allies first. 
Secretary Dulles seemed very anxious to implement the plan, 
for within a week after the April 3 conference he had con·-. 
tacted the diplomatic representatives of nine allied states. 
United States leadership believed that Great Britain's co-
operation was essential to the implementation of the plan. 
However, Prime Minister Churchill, believing that it was too 
late to save the French position at Dienbienphµ regardless 
of what the Allies did or did not do, refused to be a party 
to the proposed intervention. Secretary Dulles in the end 
had to tell the French that what they wanted the United 
States to do would be impossible. 
United States leadership, however, was convinced that 
the Communists should be denied a military victory in Indo-
China. Secretary Dulles said in March, 1954: 
If the Communist armies achieved victory in Indo-
China or any part thereof, they would surely re-
sume the same pattern of aggression against other 
32Admiral Radford at this point explained that the 
other members of the J.C.S. did not know as much about the 
Far East as he did. Chalmers M. Roberts, 11 The Day We Didn't 
Go To War, 11 ~Reporter, XI, September 14, 1954, 31. 
free peoples in the area. Under the conditions 
of today, the impositio? in Southeast Asia of 
the political system of Communist Russia, and 
30 
it's Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means,. 33 
must be a grave threat to the whole free community. 
According to a report carried in the New York Times on April 
17, 1954, a high government ~ource ~as quoted as saying: 
The situation in Southeast- Asia is currently 
the most important issue facing the United 
States. It relates to a war we might have 
to fight in the future and that we might 
lose ... Conquest of areas so vital to Japan's 
economy would reduce Japan to an economic 
satellite of the Soviet Union ... The war in 
Indo-China involves the future of Asia, of 
Europe and, finally, the bnited States ... 
The United States as a leader of the free 
world cannot afford furth~r retreat in Asia. 
It is hoped that the Unit~d States will not 
have to send troops there, but if this gov-
ernment cannot avoid it, the Adininistration 
must face up to the situation and dispatch 
forces. 34 
This was the first public statement by a top ranking member 
of the administration to the effect that there was a possi-
bility that United States troops might be deployed in Indo-
China short of direct aggression by the Chinese Communists. 
33Bulletin, XXX, April 12, 1954, pp. 539-542. The 
quote comes from a speech deliv~red by Secretary Dulles 
before the Overseas Press Club of America at New York City, 
on March 29, 1954, with the purpose of " ... outlining the 
administration's thinking about two related matters ... Indo-
China and the Chinese Communist regime." 
34New York Times, April 17, 1954, pp. 1-3. 
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The Geneva Conference 
Soon after the Korean conflict had drawn to a close, in 
July, 1953, pressure began building up in France for a nego-
tiated settlement along Kor~an lines. At Bermuda in Decem-
ber, 1953, Premier Joseph Laniel of Franc.e, President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met to 
discuss the situation in Indo-China. They decided to meet 
at the Foreign Minister level early in 1954 with the Soviet 
Union. This meeting took place in Berlin, in February, 1954. 
Here it was decided to hold a conference in Geneva in April, 
where both the Korean problem and Indo-China would be dis-
cussed. The Geneva Conference began on April 27, 1954, but 
the Indo-China part of the Conference did not begin until 
May 8. A few hours earlier, Dienbienphu had fallen to the 
Viet Minh under the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap. This, 
of course, strengthened considerab+y Ho Chi Minh's negotiat-
ing position at the Conference. It also brought the first 
.. -· . 
Indo-Chinese War to a close. It was a humiliating defeat 
for the French which brought their military influence in 
Asia to an end. 
Four sets of Agreements came out of this Conference. 35 
35 Agreement on Vietnam, Agreement on Cambodia, Agree-
ment on Laos, Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, 
July 21, 1954. 
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An analysis of these Agreements is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but they deserve most careful study, for each of the 
parties to the current conflict in Vietnam claims the Agree-
ments justify their stand. 
The principal purpose of the Geneva Convention, of 
course, was to br.ing to a close the seven and one-half year 
I 
war between Franc~ and the Viet Minh in Vietnam. The Confer-
ence, which began on April 27, lasted until July 21, 1954. 
The Soviet Union and Great Britain served as co-chairman. 
Also represented at the Conference were delegates from 
France, the Communist People's Republic of China, the United 
States, the French-sponsored State of Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia, and the Viet Minh. The Geneva Accords provided 
that Vietnam would be partitioned roughly at the Seventeenth 
Parallel. This was to be a temporary demarcation line until 
nation-wide elections could be held which would determine 
the ultimate disposition of the two regimes. Consultations 
on these elections were to begin no later than July 20, 1955, 
and elections werEf to be held by July 20, 1956. Separate 
treaties provided for independent kingdoms in Laos and Cam-
b d . 36 o ia. All three states were to be neutral, and each would 
have the right to have diplomatic relations with any nation 
36 Documents, 1954, pp. 302-310. 
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it chose. However, each side was strictly forbidden to in-
crease its military manpower or armaments beyond the replace-
ment of worn out equipment it already possessed. Neither 
side could join any military alliance or permit the estab-
lishment of a military base. on its territory under the con-
trol of a foreign nation. An Internat.i.onal Control Commis-
sion was established to supervise the implementation of the 
Agreements. India, (acting as chairman), Canada, and Poland 
were the three member states of this Commission. These were 
the principal provisions of an international agreement which 
all involved cite as supporting their position. The Agree-
ment is officially known as an Agreement on the Cessation 
·1· . . . 37 of Hosti ities in Vietnam. 
Both the Saigon and Viet Minh delegations initially 
insisted on territorial unity, and asked for national elec-
tions to be held immediately under United Nations supervi-
sion. This was clearly impossible considering the turn the 
war had taken. Partitioning the state was the only practi-
cal answer, but it is important to bear in mind that this 
division was to be only temporary. Vietnam was divided into 
"temporary regrouJ?ment areas." The South Vietnamese dele-
gate, Foreign M.inister Tran Van Do, refused to sign the 
37 rbid., pp. 283-302. 
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Agreements in protest of the provision for de facto parti-
tion of Vietnam. However, .he pledged that his government 
would take no action that would violate the te:ans of the 
Agreement. Later, President Ngo .Dinh Diem of South Vietnam 
was to say that these Agreements which were signed at Geneva 
in July of 1954 were not binding on South Vietnam because 
38 
.they were signed by a foreign military power--France. He 
therefore refused to enter negotiations with Ho Chi Minh 
concerning the elections in 1955, and refused to participate 
in the elections of 1956. 39 Later, he pe:anitted a for~ign 
nation--the United States--to establish military bases on 
South Vietnamese soil and accepted millions of dollars worth 
of military equipment from that same nation. In effect a 
de facto military alliance with the United States was creat-
ed. 
The United States delegation at Geneva was under con-
stant pressure fro~ the Congress not to sign anything which 
would give the impression of approving a surrender to the 
Communists. Thus, the United States, a non-belligerent in 
the military contest, also refused to sign the Agreements. 
38ouring the Geneva Conference, Emperor Bao Dai was 
persuaded to appoint Ngo Dinh Diem as Premier. 
39For position of United States le_adership on elec-
tions, see page 26. 
35 
The United States, however, on the last day of the Confer-
ence, issued q. so-called Unilateral Declaration. 40 The 
Soviet Union 21-nd Coqununist China may have been reluctant to 
leave the United States in a position wb.ere it would be free 
to interfere in Indo-China in. the ... future.,. or intervene in 
support of th~ Diem Regime. B.y applying. diplomatic pressure 
on the Allies of tht;! United States, . .the Communist nations 
may have been able to force Secretary Dulles to agree not to 
disturb the Agreements. Whatever may.have been the politics 
behind the United States 1 .Unilateral Declaration, it was 
' 
certainly an equivocal recognition of the Agreements. 
Secretary Dulles was in a very uncomfortable position 
at the Conference. In the first place he was fearful that 
the Conference would result in a severe diplomatic defeat 
for the West and pa~ticularly the United States; and Commun-
ist China, which the United States did not recognize, was a 
participant. It has been reported that at one point, he 
turned his back on the outstretched hand of China 1 s Premier, 
Chou En-lai. 41 Mr. Dulles left the Conference on May 4, 
even before the delegates turned to the Indo-China question. 
Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith remained to 
40 Documents, 1954, pp. 316-317. 
41 Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River (New York, 
1962), p. 695. 
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represent the United States. He read the Unilateral Decla-
ration of the United States to the delegates. This document 
contains three principal provisions: (a) the United States 
promised to "refrain from the threat or the use of force to 
disturb the Agreements," (b) the United States "would view 
any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid 
Agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening 
international peace and security." and (c) the United States 
would "continue to seek to achieve unity through free elec,.... 
tions, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they 
are conducted fairly." However, it must be remembered that 
the United States was not actually a signatory to the Agree-
ments. 
United States leadership perhaps failed to understand 
the realities of what was possible and not possible at 
Geneva. Speaking just prior to the Geneva Conference in 
April, 1954, Senator John F. Kennedy reflected this attitude 
on the floor of Congress. He warned against any "negotiated 
solution that would allow participation in the Vietnamese 
government by Ho Chi Minh." The Corrununists, he said, "would 
42 
then eventually take over because they were so popular." 
Instead, he called for an independent Vietnam supported by 
42u. s., Congressional Record, 83rd. Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1954, C, Part 4, 4672-4674. 
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the United States. 
At the Geneva Conferenc.e, however, there seemed to be 
no doubt, that national political unity could be restored by 
general elections to be held no.later than July 21, 1956. 
The idea of permanent partition had been officially rejected 
by both sides. Furthermore, Ho. Chi Minh, probably believed 
that he would very easily win the. election. President 
Eisenhower summed it up very well in his memoirs: 
I have never talked or corresponded with a person 
knowledgeable in Inda-Chinese affairs who did not 
agree that had elections been. held as of the time 
of the fighting, possibly eighty percent of the 
population would have voted for the Communist Ho 
Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of 
State Bao Dai. 43 
It must be remembered that while Ngo Dinh Diem was relative-
ly unknown even to the Vietnamese people, Ho Chi Minh was 
known and recognized internationally. His reputation as a 
national patriot first and party man second, seemed to be 
unquestioned by the Vietnamese. Ho Chi Minh, not Diem, had 
been the one who organized the opposition to the French and 
eventually defeated them at Dienbienphu. Thus for many, the 
two-year delay of the elections was simply a face-saving 
device for the West. 
In February, 1956, the Diem regime requested France to 
43Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956 
(New Jersey, 1963), p. 372. 
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withdraw its troops from South Vietnam. The French, faced 
with a new colonial crisis in Algeria,. more than willingly 
complied with the request. The French High Command was dis-
solved on April 26,_ 1956. After the French forces had moved 
out, who could guarantee that the Agreements would be imple-
mented? South Vietnam, . which was .not a .s.ign.atory, had al-
ready declared it was not bound by them. The United States 
had not signed the Agreements, though it had declared that 
it would not disturb them. Consequently, the elections 
were never held. Both the Soviet Union and the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam protested this apparent violation of the 
Accords but to no avail. The United States supported Diem's 
position and on July l, 1956, the State Department issued a 
statement charging that North Vietnam had already violated 
the cease-fire provisions and also had chosen to disregard 
h f d f . . 44 t e ree om-o -movement prov1s1ons. Secretary Dulles had 
also given his approval to Diem's refusal to hold the elec-
. 45 t1ons. 
44Bulletin, XXXV, August 13, 1956, pp. 264-269. 
45New XQ£!s. Times, March 15, 1956, p. 12. According 
to this report, Secretary Dulles did not believe that there 
would be a renewal of the conflict even if elections to 
unite North and South Vietnam were not held in July, 1956. 
39 
The Viet Minh guerrillas who had remained in South 
Vietnam after 1954 had made very little trouble for the 
Diem regime; after all why hasten what was assumed to be a 
legal transition of power? In fact, the most dangerous 
threats to Diem's re9ime during_ his first two years as 
Premier arose from Nationalist and non-Communist factions 
within South Vietnam. However, with the passage of the 
July 21, 1956, election deadline, Ho Chi Minh realized 
there was no longer even a remote chance to peacefully 
reunify Vietnam. A few months later, the Viet Minh guer-
rillas began to assassinate village chiefs in South Vietnam. 
The 1965 State Department White Paper called these guerrillas 
46 
who had never left South Vietnam "outside aggressors." 
By the time the conflict became a military challenge to Uni-
ted States leadership in 1961, the Second Indo-China War 
had been going on for almost five years. 
46Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, eds., The~ 
Viet-Nam Reader (New York, 1965), pp. 125-128. 
CHAPTER III 
UNITED STATES AID AND THE DIEM REGIME 
1954-1963 
·united States leadership has considered the maintenance 
of a pro-Western regime in South Vietnam vital to its nation-
al security interests in the entire Pacific area. For this 
reason, the United States felt compelled to commit itself 
long before the Geneva Conference began in April, 1954, to 
the maintenance of a 11 free 11 Vietnam. Aid, as has been pre-
viously noted, began in the spring of 1950, and by 1954, the 
United States Government had assumed responsibility for 
eighty percent of the French military expenditures in Indo-
China .1 Between 1950, when the United States began to absorb 
the costs of the Indo-China War, and 1954, it expended $ 1.5 
billion for this purpose, most of which was used by the 
French military forces in Vietnam. 2 The distribution of 
economic and military aid, which had averaged $500 million 
1 Hammer, p. 313. 
2 b · l' s h v· Ro ert Scig iano, out ietnam: Nation Under Stress 
(Boston, 1964), p. 111. 
4L 
annually after 1950, was under the direct supervision of a 
United States Military Assistance Advisory Group {MoA.A.G.) 
to the French forces in Inda-China. This Group had been 
created as early as July, 1950, for this purpose. 3 
This aid, however, did not accomplish its intended 
purposes, and the situation continued to deteriorate, until 
the French military forces were forced to sur~ender at the 
jungle fortress of Dienbienphu on May 8, 1954. On that same 
day, the delegates at the Geneva Conference, which had open-
ed in April, turned to the Inda-China question. 4 
Given its assumptions regarding United States security 
interests in Vietnam, the settlement reached at Geneva on 
July 21, 1954, as was stated previously, was interpreted by 
United States leadership as a diplomatic victory for Ho Chi 
Minh. Consequently, the United States moved rapidly to 
strengthen the Diem regime and the South Vietnamese economy, 
in order that it might successfully maintain itself vis-a-vis 
the Conununists. 
This chapter is concerned with the rise and fall of Ngo 
Dinh Diem. It includes a discussion of the internal problems 
3united States aid included small arms and automatic 
weapons, anununition, vehicles, aircraft, naval vessels, hos-
pital supplies and technical equipment. 
4The Geneva Conference is discussed in Chapter II. 
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with which Diem was confronted; of the inability of the Diem 
regime to cope with these domestic difficulties, and of how 
this led United States leadership, given its assumptions 
regarding its vital security interests in the area, to at-
tempt to stabilize the Diem regime through the employment of 
aid. Thus, it is shown in this chapter that United States 
aid was extended to the Diem regime for the purpose of stab-
ilizing the political order and that the evolution of the 
aid program can be observed in stages, as the problems of 
stabilizing the political order became more difficult. The 
increasing difficulty experienced by the Diem regime was 
paralleled by an increasing involvement by the United States. 
Several events occurred during the summer of 1954 which 
were of special significance for the future of Vietnam. One, 
of course, was the Conference which ended at Geneva on July 
21. A month before, on June 18, Pierre Mendes-France had 
been invested as Premier by the French National Assembly. On 
this same day in Paris, Ngo Dinh Diem also announced that he 
had accepted the Emperor Bao Dai's invitation to take over 
the premiership of the newly created Associated State of 
Vietnam. 
Ngo Dinh Diem, who had demanded and received from Emper-
or Bao Dai full civil and military power, formally assumed 
office on July 7, 1954. In the past Diem had continually 
refused to accept the premiership unless Vietnam was accorded 
43 
dominion status similar to that of India and Pakistan in the 
British Commonwealth of Nations. Vietnam was now, of course, 
an independent state and had even withdrawn from the French 
Union. Under Ngo Dinh Diem's leadership, South Vietnam not 
only succeeded in eliminating the remaining political in-
fluences exercised by France, but by the Emperor Bao Dai as 
well. One of the foremost Asian scholars of the United 
States writing in 1954 called Diem the 11 most prominent of 
the nationalist leaders in 1953. 115 
Ngo Dinh Diem's fame as an 11 uncompromising 11 . nationalist 
leader in Vietnam had been established as far back as 1933. 
In May of 1933, Bao Dai, who had become Emperor the previous 
year, appointed the thirty-two year old Diem to the post of 
Minister of Interior. Diem, a Catholic and a member of Viet-
nam's feudal aristocracy, soon found that his efforts at re-
form were being blocked by the French colonial administra-
tors. He therefore resigned his post in September, 1933, 
and went into semi-retirement from public li.fe. He contin-
ued, however, to work for the independence of Vietnam. What 
distinguished Diem from most of the other nationalist leaders 
was the fact that he continually refused to commit himself 
to the French, the Viet Minh, or the restored Bao Dai regime 
until he accepted the post of Prime Minister in 1954. Ngo 
5 Hammer, p. 286 . 
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Dinh Diem was therefore, by 1954, the symbol of unyielding 
opposition to colonialism and Communism. 
By 1954, Diem was also well known to United States 
leadership. He had come to the United States in 1950, upon 
the advice of a Michigan State University political scient-
ist, Wesley Fishel, whom he had met on a visit to Japan. 
Fishel had persuaded Diem to come to the United States to 
plead his case for Vietnamese independence. While in the 
United States, he managed to enlist in his cause many impor-
tant and influential Americans. Among these were Francis 
Cardinal Spellman and Supreme Court Justice William O. Doug-
las. Through Justice Douglas, Diem met Senators Mike Mans-
field and John Kennedy. Both Senators Kennedy and Mansfield 
believed that in Diem the United States had found a popular 
alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Senator Kennedy in a speech 
made in April of 1954 called for an independent (that is, an 
anti-Communist) Vietnam and had.Diem in mind as the logical 
man to lead this regime. 6 
There are many hypotheses as to why United States lead-
ership decided to support Diem. A recent book about the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, for example, placed the responsi-
bility for swinging United States support to Diem on Edward 
6u. s., Congre9sional Record, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1954, C, Part 4, 4672-4674. 
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Lansdale, a C.I.A. agent serving in Vietnam during President 
E . h I Adm' . . 7 isen ower s 1n1strat1on. But such a ... view ignores the 
fact that in 1954, United States leadership, given its in-
terests, had no alternative. Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic, was 
anti-Communist and satisfied the requirements for serving as 
an instrument of the United States .. The leadership of the 
United States, ther~fore, became convinced af±.er deciding to 
aid the South Vietnamese regime that the anti~Communist 
nationalism proclaimed by Ngo Dinh Diem was.indispensable to 
its objectives. As early as October of 1954, President Eis-
enhower in a letter to Diem assured him of the support of the 
United States. 8 This letter has been cited many times as 
proof of United States' commitment to the South Vietnamese 
regime. Without United States support it is doubtful that 
Ngo Dinh Diem would have remained in power as long as he did. 
That his regime was politically dependent on this support 
was demonstrated many times. One example to illustrate his 
political dependence was the support which United States 
leadership extended him when he was having sharp disagree-
ments with his chief of staff, General Nguyen Van Hinh. 
7David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Govern-
~ (New York, 1964), p. 34. 
8Raskin and Fall, p. 100. 
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General Hinh had disobeyed several orders from Diem includ-
ing one sending him to France. Hinh was warned by United 
States leadership that aid to South Vietnam would be immedi-
ately cut off if he made any attempt to unseat the Premier. 9 
President Eisenhower's special ambassaqor .. to Vietnam, General 
V. Lawton Collins, repeated this warning .. to General Hinh' s 
military supporters on November 17, shortly after his arrival 
. s . 10 in aigon. General Hinh left Vietnam on November 19, after 
a summons from Emperor Bao Dai, and, once safely out of the 
country, was dismissed from his post. 
In October, 1954, Senator Mike Mansfield issued a re-
port, recommending that: 11 In the event that the.Diem govern-
ment falls, I believe that the United States should consider 
an immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam and the French 
Union Forces there. 1111 This report not only in£luenced Uni-
ted States leadership but also led to a be.lief among the 
Vietnamese that Diem was the only man that. the United States 
would deal with. Any group that ousted him would not re-
9 Peter Schmid, "Free Indo-China Fights Against Time", 
Commentary, January, 1955, p. 28. 
lONew York Times, November 17, 1954, p. 14. 
11senator Mike Mansfield, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Report .Qn Indo-China, October 15, 1954, (Washing-
ton, 1954), p. 14. 
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ceive the support of the United States .. The North Vietnamese 
government and the National Liberation Front always referred 
to the South Vietnamese government as "My-Diem" or American-
Diem-regime. Without United States military, economic, and 
financial aid the Diem regime could not have survived its 
domestic difficulties, much less have coped with the pressure 
applied to the regime by Ho Chi Minh. 
The Diem regime, believing that with United States sup-
port it would be secure in the future, demonstrated a repres-
sive and authoritarian character in many ways. By 1957, for 
example, any criticism of the methods employed by the regime 
was not tolerated, and anyone who opposed the regime was 
dealt with harshly. The police, guided by their informers, 
seemed determined to eliminate the last vestige of opposi-
tion. The situation grew so bad in 195.8 and 1959 that Diem 
finally alienated the villagers against the regime. With 
disorder and insecurity returning, many civilian and military 
groups in the nationalist camp came to the conclusion that 
the powers of Diem had to be limited or he had to be removed 
from power. 
The United States continued to support Diem, however, be-
cause of its primary concern with security and the felt need 
to maintain in power a non-Communist regime. Because United 
States leadership viewed security solely in military terms, 
it failed to fully grasp the political nature of guerrilla 
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warfare and the importance of political reform as the most 
effective means of countering the Communist challenge to 
Vietnam. Because of its preoccupation with security, the 
United States was willing to give in to the Vietnamese gov-
ernment on most other issues. The United States might have 
wished that Diem was a little more democratic, and it cer-
tainly was not blind to the regime's shortcomings; but its 
leadership considered him the only alternative to the Commun-
ists in Vietnam. 
Internal Problems 
The partition of Vietnam near the Seventeenth Paralle1 
was a political necessity at the Geneva Conference, consid-
ering the turn the war had taken. Economically, however, it 
was an unnatural and unfortunate division. From the begin-
ning of French colonial rule in the 1870's, Vietnam had de-
veloped as an economically integrated unit. Most of her in-
dustry was located in the North, while the South was devoted 
principally to the raising of agricultural products and fish-
ing. This was a logical development, and because of terri-
torial specialization, there had always been a considerable 
degree of trade between the two areas. But this was not the 
only problem. The Civil War from 1946 to 1954, had virtually 
devastated the economic structure of the country. Thousands 
of acres of agricultural land had been abandoned to the jun-
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gle, while roads, railroads, and inland waterways had been 
severely damaged. Vietnam's independence from French colon-
ial rule also resulted in an exodus of French firms, which 
meant that Vietnam would suffer in the future from a shortage 
of skilled personnel. It also meant the cessation of new 
French investment. Meanwhile, the Diem regime had to cope 
with the problem of assimilating nearly 850,000 refugees 
from the North into the already weakened economy. The evacu-
ation of the 178,000-man French Expeditionary. Corps from 
Vietnam meant a loss of the most important income-generating 
group in the state. The departure of French troops, complet-
ed on April 26, 1956, directly cost 85,000 people their jobs 
in South Vietnam. 
Another problem the Diem regime had to face was the 
archaic and cumbersome governmental system it had inherited 
from the French. The French had never allowed the Vietnamese 
to exercise executive responsibility in the civil service, 
so the Diem regime suffered from lack of competent, and 
experienced officials. Many had gone over to the side of 
Ho Chi Minh. The country was also left with an education 
system that had not prepared the Vietnamese for the civil 
service. A number of intellectuals withheld support from 
Diem because of authentic political differences with the new 
regime. Many others did not extend their support to Diem 
because of the habit they had fallen into during the long 
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years of battling the French, of refusing their support to 
the established government. The Vietnamese, it will be re-
called, had considered the Emperor Bao Dai a puppet of the 
French colonialists when he returned to his throne in late 
1949. In contrast to the Diem regime, Ho Chi Minh's govern-
ment dated back to 1945. It was unified by strict Communist 
Party discipline. The regime also had a vast network of 
agents in the South, and the Vietnam People's Army comprised 
seven hard-core divisions abundantly equipped with modern 
United States weapons which had been captured by the Chinese 
in Korea and sent to the forces of Ho Chi Minh. The Northern 
regime also had an unconquerable will and determination to 
win control over the south and unite the country. 
In 1954, some 80,000 Viet Minh guerrillas and regulars, 
in accordance with the Geneva Accords, went northward. How-
ever, the elite of General Giap's southern force, perhaps 
another 5,000 to 6,000,simply went underground. There were, 
in effect, from this time on two governments in South Viet-
nam. The Viet Minh forces in the South were so well organ-
ized that when night came, much of the rural area came under 
their domination. The strength of the Viet Minh forces in 
the south grew, nurtured by economic chaos and the political 
deficiencies of the Saigon regime. As the strength of the 
Viet Minh grew, there was growing dissatisfaction among the 
South Vietnamese peasants with a regime that no longer could 
maintain law and order. Economic progress in the South 
slowed down considerably as lawlessness increased. 
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In its attempt to restore law and order and solve its 
many domestic difficulties, the Diem regime increasingly 
resorted to dictatorial and repressive methods, and in so 
doing, alienated large segments of the population. 
The Diem regime, however, did manage to carry out many 
positive reforms. A new university was established at Hue. 
Malaria eradication teams were sent into the countryside. 
The large leper population in South Vietnam was treated ex-
tensively with drugs, developed, manufactured and supplied 
by the government. The entire rural health program was 
expanded. Food and textile production rose above prewar 
levels. Prior to 1954, the south had relied upon the north 
for most of its manufactured goods. There was some light 
manufacturing in the south but not enough to sustain the 
economy. ,Most of these goods after 1954 had to be imported 
becaus~ Diem continually refused to negotiate any kind of 
trade agreement with Ho Chi Minh. This attitude on the part 
of Ngo Dinh Diem amounted in fact to an economic blockade of 
North Vietnam which, until then, had received an average of 
more than 200,000 tons of rice a year from the South. 
President Diem's main problem, however, was one of try-
ing to consolidate support in the south for his regime. As 
previously m~ntioned, President Diem had considerable diffi-
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culty in sec~ring competent personnel in the government. 
Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that he .should 
come to depend largely upon his Roman Catholic family to 
assist hi~ in carrying out his official responsibilities. 
However, the Vietnamese resented the nepotistic practices he 
followed in choosing his top governmental associates. For 
example, one of his brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was the chief ad-
visor to the President as well as the head of the secret po-
lice organization in South Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Can, another 
brother, was the Governor of Central Vietnam. A third broth-
er, Ngo Dinh Thuc, was the Archbishop of Hue, while a fourth 
brother Ngo Dinh Luyen, was Ambassador to Great Britain. 
Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu was the official hostess at the President-
ial Palace and a deputy in the National Assembly. Madame 
Nhu's father, Tran Van Thoung, was Ambassador to the United 
States, anq her mother was the permanent Vietnamese observer 
at the United Nations. This then, was the ruling elite of 
South Vietnam, in which only about seven per cent of the pop-
ulation was Roman Catholic. Thus, President Diem created a 
dynastic, family rule and carried personal centralization to 
an extreme point. President Diem found it difficult to 
bridge the gulf between this ruling elite and the Vietnamese 
people. The overwhelming majority of the refugees from the 
north who crossed the Seventeenth Parallel during the 300 
days (the time alloted by the Geneva Accords for free move-
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ment between the two zones) 12 were Catholic. This gave to 
the regime a $trong Catholic cast. For example, of the 123 
deputies in the first National Assembly, twenty-seven members 
(twenty-two per cent) were Catholics. 13 
Another unfortunate act by President Diem was the an-
nouncement that the one million Chinese in Vietnam would 
have to become citizens. A presidential order was issued on 
August 22, 1956, which declared that all persons of Chinese 
parentage born in Vietnam were now Vietnamese citizens. 
This act was resented by many of the Chinese in South Viet-
nam as 11 compulsory naturalization. 11 A further order, issued 
in March, 1957, declared that no alien would be allowed to 
conduct any type of retail business in South Vietnam. This 
order seriously affected the 600, 000 Chinese resi·dents of 
Saigon-Cholon, 14 who owned or controlled most of the commerce 
and light industry in that city. 
Thus, President Diem continued to alienate large seg-
ments of the population. He promised the 700,000 or so 
mountain tribal people, known as the Montagnards, equality 
and integration with the lowland Vietnamese. The Montag-
12Gettleman, p. 198. 
13 
. l' 54 Sc1g iano, p. . 
14cholon is the Chinese suburb of Saigon. 
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nards, who made up less than five per cent of the population 
of South Vietnam, but occupied sixty per cent of the coun-
try's territory, soon discovered that 11 equality 11 meant the 
right of the lowland Vietnamese to colonize the hill areas 
and drive the tribesmen back into more inhospitable areas. 
President Diem also wanted to close the tribal schools where 
classes were taught in the native dialects. The North Viet-
nam regime dealt with the problem entirely differently. 
Two autonomous zones were created in North Vietnam where 
Montagnafd tribal leaders were free to deal with their own 
local affairs. An Advisory Council on Minorities was created 
in Hanoi which advised the government on all matters affect-
ing the tribes. 
Thus, under the rule of President Diem and his Roman Catholic 
family, the disintegration of South Vietnamese political and 
economic order proceeded. Businessmen were restive under 
the rigidity and complexity of the many government controls. 
The Chinese community in Saigon-Cholon was resentful of the 
discriminatory laws passed by the National Assembly. The 
Buddhists were claiming discrimination because President 
Diem was a Catholic. The South Vietnamese were also resent-
ful of the fact that the government was controlled by Viet-
namese from central and North Vietnam. The government lacked 
broad sufport and confidence. The people themselves were 
without even the rudimentary political rights. 
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United States Aid and the Diem Regime 
These problems placed a heavy burden on the already 
limited resources of the country and resulted in inflation, 
which was contained only by massive amounts of United States 
economic aid. Considering United States leadership's assump-
tions re9arding its vital security interests in Southeast 
Asia, the deci~don to strengthen the Diem regime through the 
employment of vast amounts of economic and military aid was 
a logical one. It was felt that if the United States did 
not establish the South Vietnamese government on a more per-
manent footing, it would fall to Communist leadership. If 
this happened, the entire strategic defense position of the 
United States in the Pacific area would be endangered. Thus, 
assistance was rendered to the South Vietnamese Government 
because of its inability to cope with its domestic difficul-
ties .15 These domestic difficulties threatened to engulf 
the regime, and President Diem was without the economic, 
military or moral resources to cope with them. 
Economic ;id, therefore, has been vital to the Diem 
regime from its beginning in 1954. The United States assumed 
economic responsibility not only for the influx of the refu-
15The Viet Minh did not pose a grave threat to the sec-
urity of the South Vietncunese government until the July, 
1956 election deadline hqd p~ssed. 
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gees from the North who needed immediate economic assistance, 
but also for the support of the large South Vietnamese army 
which had been almost entirely dependent upon French finan-
cial aid. United States military and technical assistance 
was increased, and foreign service personnel was considerably 
augmented. Beginning on January 1, 1955, United States aid 
was given directly to the Vietnamese government, bypassing 
the French authorities entirely. This was a reflection of 
diminishing French influence over Vietnamese affairs. By 
1960, South Vietnam was more dependent on United States aid 
than any other state in the world, with the exception of 
Laos. 16 From 1955 to 1960, United States economic assistance 
to the South Vietnamese government totaled $1,387,200,000. 
During this same period, military equipment and supplies 
d 1 $500 ·11· 17 amounte to a most mi ion. Another indication of 
the necessity of United States aid to the South Vietnamese 
economy was the foreign exchange gap which was closed by the 
economic assistance during the early years of the Deim Re-
gime. For example, during 1960, Vietnam exported $84 million 
16As compared to Vietnam's economic aid of $13.7 per 
capita in 1960, Laos received $17.0, Taiwan $12.5, Korea 
$8.6, Pakistan $3.8, India $1.9, and Thailand $1.2. Milton 
C. Taylor, 11 south Viet-Nam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress, 11 
Pacific Affairs, 34 (Fall, 1961), 244. 
17Ibid. 
57 
in goods and imported $239 million, resulting in a trade 
deficit of $155 million. United States economic assistance 
in that year, however, amounted to $179 million. 
TABLE I 18 
FIGURES IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS 
Year Exports Imports Trade Deficit American Economic Assistance 
1956 34 205 171 210 
1957 80 269 189 282 
1958 55 232 177 187 
1959 75 225 150 207 
1960 84 239 155 179 
United States aid during the first two years of the 
Diem administration, however, was limited in both time and 
scope by the nation-wide Vietnamese elections scheduled to 
take place no later than July 21, 1956. It was only after 
it was certain that these elections would not be held that 
the United States came to regard its aid to the Diem regime 
18Ibid. Foreign trade and United States aid statistics 
are summarized above in Table 1 (in millions of U. s. Dol-
lars, with trade figures on a calendar year basis and aid 
on a fiscal year) . Totals are rounded to the nearest one 
million. 
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as a long-range program with important implications for the 
entire economic structure of South Vietnam. This, of course, 
called for a revaluation of the entire aid program. One 
problem was the official exchange rate of thirty-five pias-
tres to the dollar, which was maintained in South Vietnam, 
although on the semi-official market the piastre was worth 
less than half that amount, and in Hong Kong it was worth 
even less. The size of the aid program to South Vietnam has 
always been dictated primarily by military considerations 
and has been consumption-oriented. Economic development has 
been only of secondary importance. 
Table II indicates that two-thirds of the total United 
States aid granted between the years 1954 and 1958 was used 
to finance the redevelopment of the South Vietnamese para-
military and military forces. From 1955 to 1960, only thir-
teen per cent of all United States aid was available for 
,. 
economic and technical aid projects. For the five fiscal 
years from 1955 to 1959, the aid program (excluding military 
hardware) totaled $1,101.1 million. The United States Opera-
tions Mission also provided additional non-defense expendi-
tures of $127.6 million in project aid and $16.2 million for 
technical cooperation. Sixty eight per cent of this aid was 
spent for defense. In 1958, United States aid accounted for 
62 per cent of total public expenditures in South Vietnam. 
Admiral Felix Stump summed up the importance of economic 
TABLE II 
AMERICAN AID, 1954-58* 19 
{in thousands of dollars} 
Fiscal 
Year 
1957-58* 
1956-57 
1955-56 
1954-55 
Military 
Support 
$155,000 
173,000 
109,000 
234,800 
TOTAL $671,800 
Percent of 
Total 69 
Refugee 
Aid 
$37,000 
55,785 
$92,785 
9 
Economic and 
Technical 
Assistance 
$29,000 
82,900 
50,500 
29,715 
$192,115 
22 
59 
Total 
$184,000 
255,900 
196,500 
320,300 
$956,700 
100 
* Totals for 1958 are tentative. A $25 million loan was also 
extended which would be added to the economic and technical 
assistance total of $50 million. In 1957-58 about 50 per 
cent of the economic and technical assistance total was allo-
cated to the construction of a modern highway between Saigon 
and Bien Hoa. 
and military aid to the objective of realizing security very 
well in 1958 when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Corn-
rnittee: 
19Richard W. Lindholm, "American Aid and Its Financial 
Impact", Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, ed. Richard W. 
Lindhold {Michigan, 1959), p. 317. 
The free world could not hold the non-communist 
nations- without economic and military aid. With 
all Asia in the Soviet orbit, I don't think 
Europe and the Middle East could survive the 
threat of Communism. This would leave the Uni-
ted States an island in the Communist world, 
and eventually this country would be brought 
to its knees by the Soviet-dominated nations. 
Foreign military and economic aid are absolutely20 
essential to the survival of the United States. 
The importance of the security objective, for example, has 
been reflected in the size of the United States military 
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mission in South Vietnam as compared to that of the economic 
and other groups. The economic aid program has been used in 
many ways to generate resources for support of the vast mili-
tary budget; in other words, economic and technical aid pro-
jects have been tailored to serve military purposes. For 
example, it was announced in the spring of 1961 that the 
United States would increase its aid in order to expand the 
Vietnamese army by 20,000 men. This announcement came after 
Vice-President Johnson's visit to South Vietnam in May. 21 
There can be no doubt that this decision by United States 
leadership had an economic impact by causing a rise in the 
dollar level of the commercial import program, but the moti-
vation for this decision was entirely military. At a press 
20 U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1958, 85th Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1958, p. 104. 
21Bulletin, XLIV, May 22, 1961, p. 957. 
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conference held in Washington on May 4, 1961, Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk reported that the Viet Minh forces in South 
Vietnam had increased to 12,000 men and during 1960, they 
had killed and kidnaped more than 3,000 people. He also 
said the United States was ready to render to South Vietnam 
11 every possible help, across the entire spectrum in which 
help is needed." He refused to comment, however, on whether 
th U 't d . h . 'l' 'l 22 e ni e States mig t intervene mi itari y. 
It was announced on May 5, 1961, that Vice-President 
Lyndon Johnson would go to Asia on a so-called fact-finding 
mission~ 23 Vice-President Johnson declared in a speech de-
livered to the South Vietnamese National Assembly on May 11 
that the United States was ready "immediately11 to help ex-
pand South Vietnam's armed forces and to 11 meet the needs of 
your people on education, rural development, new industry, 
24 
and long-range economic development. 11 He declared on May 
12 that the United States would stand 11 shoulder to shoulder 11 
with South Vietnam in its war against communism. 25 If the 
United States was not completely committed to the Diem re-
22 rbid., pp. 756-763. 
23 Ibid., p. 750. 
24~ York Times, May 12, 1961, pp. 1-2. 
25 rbid., May 13, 1961, pp. 1-2. 
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gime before Vice-President Johnson went to Southeast Asia on 
his fact-finding mission, it certainly was after he returned. 
President Kennedy gave no hint in his announcement that he 
was sending the Vice-President to Southeast Asia that he 
had empowered him to make such broad, sweeping statements 
about what the United States was prepared to do. However, 
these statements must be viewed as official policy statements 
of the Kennedy Administration. The United States, having 
once made a financial commitment, was now prepared to go all 
the way, "across the entire spectrum", as Secretary Rusk 
put it, in defense of the South Vietnamese regime. It was 
announced on May 13, 1961, that an agreement had been reached 
by the Vice-President and President Diem for increased Uni-
ted States aid to South Vietnam. The aid increases, expect-
ed to total $40 million, were to be useq primarily to: 
(a) strengthen the S~uth Vietnamese army and civil guard, 
and (b) support social welfare and public works programs. 26 
The same day, May 13, 1961, Vice-President Johnson declared 
before a joint sessionof the Philippine Congress: 
America will honor her commitment to the cause 
of freedom throughout the community of free 
nations; we will proceed either alone or with 27 
our free friends to preserve our position in Asia. 
26rbid., May 14, 1961, pp. 1-4. 
27 
I]:)id., p. 3. 
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The only interpretation that can be drawn from such a state-
rnent is that the United States was prepared to embark upon 
a unilateral course of action in Southeast Asia, if neces-
sary, to preserve its own vit~l security interests in the 
area. The issue of freedom was only of secondary importance. 
United States leadership has very carefully defined what 
these vital interests were, but it has remained unclear as 
to exactly how they were being endangered by the civil con-
flict in Vietnam. 28 
A program was announced on January 4, 1962, in which 
the United States and the South Vietnamese governments would 
cooperate in starting "a broad economic and social program 
aimed at providing every Vietnamese with the means of im-
proving his standard of living." 29 In the past, President 
Diem had resisted most of the suggested political reforms. 
These reforms, the United States believed, were essential, 
in that they would enable the South Vietnamese regime to corn-
bat the Viet Minh guerrillas more effectively in the social 
and economic, as well as the military field. The program 
was to be financed by South Vietnam by means of heavy duties 
on luxury imports and by a new tax system. The United States 
28For discussion of America's vital security interests 
in Asia, see Chapter II. 
29 New York Times, January 5, 1962, pp. 1-2. 
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would provide advice, support essential imports, and finance 
specific projects. The announcement al.so states that expen-
ditures for South Vietnam would be "appreciably" above the 
$136 million worth of economic aid provided in 1961. It 
also stressed that the United States 11 sim11ltaneously" would 
act to strengthen South_ Vietnam militarily. Thus, in 1962 
and 1963, the United States "conunitment" to protect and main-
tain a South Vietnamese regime against internal political 
forces and "external" aggression had become complete. The 
Diem regime, unable to cope with ei'ther its domestic prob-
lems or the civil conflict which threatened to engulf it, 
continued to deteriorate. While the process of deteriora-
tion progressed, the regime became more and more dictatorial 
and oppressive, until many of its initial supporters had 
turned against it. United States leadership, determined to 
prevent the deterioration of the regime, extended vast 
amounts of military and economic aid. to President Diem for 
the purpose of building him up and stabilizing his govern-
ment. However, the large-scale military and consumption-
oriented United States aid program did not accomplish its 
purpose, for it did not contribute to genuine economic 
growth. Thus, United States aid insured its own perpetua-
tion. The United States conunitment to South Vietnam, then, 
is a concomitance of the economic and military aid to that 
state. As South Vietnam's domestic and foreign difficulties 
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increased, so did United States aid and its leadership's 
commitment to the regime. In the next chapter, the process 
whereby this economic and political commitment evolved into 
a full-scale military commitment to South Vietnam by Feb~ 
ruary, 1965, is discussed. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMITMENT AND 
THE MA~NTENANCE OF POLITICAL ORDER 
If a viable, pro-Western regime in south Vietnam was 
essential to the national security interests of the United 
states in the Pacific area, then a strong political leader-
ship had to be cultivated. Ngo Dinh Diem seemed to qualify 
as the only man in south Vietnam capable of creating and 
maintaining a pro-Western regime. At least he was the one 
considered to be most likely to succeed. Therefore, the 
Diem regime was extended United states support against the 
internal disorders which threatened to destroy it and against 
what was interpreted as communist aggression. The United 
States leadership as early as 1954 was forced to make risky 
calculations about the military, economic, and political 
costs of such an engagement. In its determination to pre-
vent the deterioration of the Diem regime, vast amounts of 
military and economic aid were extended to President Diem 
for the purpose of constructing and stabilizing a government. 
However, the large scale military and consumption-oriented 
United States aid program did not accomplish its purpose, 
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because genuine economic growth did not result, nor did poli-
tical stability. United States aid seemed to insure its own 
perpetuation. As South Vietnam's domestic and foreign dif-
ficulties increased, so did United States aid, and so did 
the cormnitment to the Regime. In this chapter, the process 
by which this economic and political cormnitment evolved by 
February, 1965, into a full-scale military cormnitment to 
South Vietnam is examined. 
"Power", said Madame Nhu, "is wonderful. Total power 
1 is totally wonderful." This attitude was also shared by 
her husband Ngo Dinh Nhu, who was President Diem's brother, 
chief adviser and head of the secret police in South Vietnam. 
It provides some indication of the cause of the Buddhist up-
rising of 1963, which culminated in the military coup on 
November 1, 1963, and the subsequent overthrow and brutal 
assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu. 
Tran Van Choung, Madame Nhu's father, said of Diem and his 
brothers, 
They are very much like medieval inquisitors who 
are so convinced of their righteousness that they 
would burn people for their own sake, and for the2 
sake of mankind, to save them from error and sin. 
1Dennis Warner, "Agony in Saigon: The Lady and the Cada-
ver, 11 The Reporter, October 10, 1963, pp. 39-42. 
2Ibid., p. 41. 
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During the month of May, 1963, the South Vietnamese 
Buddhists began a series of riotous demonstrations against 
President Diem, his government, and his Roman Catholic family, 
whom they accused of anti-Buddhist discrimination. In order 
to dramatize their protests publicly, several Buddhist monks 
and nuns burned themselves to death. 
Throughout this entire agonizing year, however, United 
States involvement in the conflict continued to mount. Pres-
ident Diem was warned by the United States that he would be 
wise to end the Buddhist repression, try to restore good re-
lations between his regime and the people, and concentrate 
his efforts on battling communist aggression. The United 
States, however, seemed to assure Diem at the same time that 
support for his government would continue. 
Economic and military aid to South Vietnam came into 
serious question in the United States in 1963. A report sub-
mitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a four-
man panel headed by Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield, 
questioned the wisdom of continuing to give economic and 
military aid to the South Vietnamese regime. The report was 
made public February 24, 1963, and declared that: 
This intensification inevitably has carried us to 
the start of the road which leads to the point at 
which the conflict could become of greater concern 
and greater responsibility to the United States 
than it is to the government and people of South 
Vietnam. There is no interest of the United States 
in Vietnam which 'WOuld justify, in present circurn-
stances, the conversion of the war primarily into 
an American War to be fought primarily with Ameri-
can lives. 3 
The Corrunittee believed that the United States should reap-
praise its "overall security requirement on the Southeast 
Asia mainland" in order to initiate a gradual reduction in 
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the United States military and economic aid programs. Sena-
tor Mike Mansfield recalling his visit to South Vietnam in 
1955, cormnented in this report that what disturbed him was 
that all the problems that existed in South Vietnam then 
still existed in 1963, seven years later and after two bil-
lion dollars worth of United States aid had been spent. 
There were other spokesmen, poth in Congress and out, who 
accused the administration of pursuing a "no-win" policy in 
South Vietnam. When asked to cormnent on these criticisms of 
United States Vietnamese policy at his February 13, 1963, 
news conference in Los Angeles, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
replied: 
Our policy there is not that we put in doughboys 
to do every bit of the job ourselves but that we 
do what we can to put the Vietnamese in a position 
to win their war, and they are beginning to win it. 
It's going to be a long and tough and frustrating 
and mean war, as any guerrilla operation of that 
sort has been in the past, whether in Greece or 
in Malaya. 
I think it would do some 10,000 or 11,000 men out 
there a disservice to think this was a "no-win" 
3 New York Times, February 25, 1963, p. 2. 
policy. They are working with great gallantry 
and under great difficulties, and the Vietnamese 
are too. 4 
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The anti-government activity which led to the downfall 
of the Diem regime in 1963 also had the effect of solidifying 
the United States' commitment to South Vietnam. The Buddhist 
demonstrations began at Hue, the old capital.on the northern 
coast and a traditional center of Buddhist learning, 400 
miles north of Saigon. The ruler of Hue was Ngo Dinh Can, 
a brother of Diem. Another brother, Archbishop Ngo Dinh 
Thuc's see was also at Hue. The demonstrations were touched 
off by a telegram from President Diem in Saigon ordering 
enforcement of a regulation that only the national flag could 
be flown during religious ceremonies. The Buddhists were 
preparing to commemorate the 2,507th anniversary of the 
Buddha's birth on May 8, 1963,. when the order was issued. 
Just prior to the planned Buddhist celebration, the Catholics 
in Hue had been celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc's consecration as bishop. During 
these ceremonies, which ended on Sunday, May 5, Vatican flags 
had been flying all over the city. On May 8, over 9,000 
Buddhists demonstrated in Hue against this obvious religious 
discrimination on the part of President Diem and his Catholic 
family. The crowd was forcibly dispersed, and nine people 
4Bulletin, V. 48, March 11, 1963, p. 365. 
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were killed. 
The Buddhist leaders on May 15, 1963, demanded that the 
Government grant Buddhists the same legal rights as Roman 
Catholics and withdraw its ban again.st. re.ligious flags. 
They also demanded the freedom to preach.their religion and 
requested that the officials responsible for the incident in 
Hue be punished. The only response from the government was 
to replace three officials in Hue. The Buddhist leaders re-
jected this as insufficient and announced that the public 
protests would be continued until all their demands were 
met. On June 11, a Buddhist monk, Quang Due, seventy-three, 
committed suicide by burning himself to death in Saigon. 5 
This event initiated a series of self-immolations during the 
6 
summer of 1963. All of these were in protest against the 
government's policies. Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu in an address in 
Saigon on August 3, 1963, referred to the suicides as "bar-
beques". She called Quang Due's suicide "murder", and went 
on to say: 
What else can be said when they (the Buddhist lead-
ers) murder their own kin and their own peers in a 
most barbaric manner under the pretext of defend-
ing a faith that has never been under attack. 7 
5~ ~Times, June 11, 1963, p. 6. 
6seven monks and nuns committed suicide by fire during 
the summer of 1963 in protest of the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment's arbitrary actions. 
7New York Times, August 4, 1963, p. 1. 
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The same day, Ngo Dinh Nhu, warned in a Saigon interview that 
if the Buddhist crisis was not soon resolved "it will lead 
toward a coup d'etat that would be anti-American and anti-
Buddhist. 118 
In August, 1963, the Diem government struck back at the 
Buddhist protest movement charging that the leaders of the 
uprising were acting as tools of the Communists. The na-
tion's major pagodas were seized, and many priests and stu-
dent demonstrators were arrested. On August 21, 1963, Pres-
ident Diem imposed nation-wide martial law. Censorship was 
imposed and a 9:00 p.m. - 5:00 a.m. curfew was ordered. At 
a Washington press conference on August 16, 1963, Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk said that the United States was "deeply 
distressed by the dissensions that have occurred in South 
Vietnam." He went on to say: 
We are especially distressed because we regret 
anything which seems to create disunity at a time 9 
when things were moving in a favorable direction. 
Speaking in Washington on August 25, 1963, Theodore J. c. 
Heavner, Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group, said 
in connection with the repressive measures taken by the Diem 
government against the Buddhist leaders: 
8Ibid. I p. 15. 
9Bulletin, V. 49, September 2, 1963, p. 359. 
This action represents a direct violation by the 
Vietnamese Government of assurances that it was 
pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the 
Buddhists. The United States can only deplore 
repressive actions of this nature. 10 
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The Department of State had issued a statement on August 21, 
11 1963, to this same effect. The United States made it clear 
on August 23, 1963, however, that the situation would have 
no effect on its basic policy of assisting Vietnam in its 
12 
war against the Viet Cong. 
The United States, given its commitment, was either 
powerless to change the course of action of the Diem regime 
or believed that in time conditions would improve. Diem 
advocated democracy, which was set forth as a ruling concept 
in the Constitution; but in practice it was curtailed and 
abridged by the use of clandestine political and overt po-
lice controls, initiated and applied by his brothers, espec-
ially Ngo Dinh Nhu. If President Diem could have pursued 
more tolerant policies toward the Buddhists and instituted 
and sustained a good land reform program, he might have been 
able to gain support for his government even without holding 
national elections. Robert G. Scigliano, a critic of the 
10rbid., September 9, 1963, p. 395. 
11Ibid o / po 398 • 
12Ibid. 
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Diem regime, was in South Vietnam in 1958-1959 as an admin-
istrative advisor. Scigliano said of the Diem regime: 
It would seem that the Ngo Dinh Diem government 
has been unnecessarily cautious and has at times 
acted for narrow advantage in dealing with the 
problem of political freedom. 
Referring to Diem's opposition in the August, 1959, elec-
tions, he said the opposition was agreed on the fact that 
the regime was: 
A family dictatorship run by a man who is in-
capable of sharing power and will go to almost 
any length to preserve it. It (the opposition) 
doubts the regime's integrity and ability 
though it often excludes the President himself 
from the first of these judgments and disbelieves 
in its (the regime's) good motives. 1 3 
There can be no doubt that President Diem was repressive 
and, what is worse, almost completely impervious to advice. 
This made it difficult, of course, if not impossible, for 
other leaders to emerge. In his struggle to extend his 
authority throughout the country, the methods employed by 
Diem were often ruthless. However, it must be remembered, 
he was confronted with an almost impossible situation from 
the very beginning. Saigon itself was dominated by a "sect" 
of adventurers known as the Binh Xuyen, which had exercised 
almost absolute, feudalistic control over a large part of 
13 Ro]:)ert G. Scigliano, "Political Parties in South 
Vietnam Unqer the Republic", Public Affairs, XXXIII (1960), 
327-346. 
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Vietnam for years. A large part of Cochin China was con-
trolled by two other political-religious sects, the Cao Dai 
and the Hao Hao. All of the sects at one time or another 
had resisted the Viet Minh or the French. By 1956, President 
Diem had rendered these sects politically and militarily 
powerless. He also had to deal with the Viet Minh, who were 
left behind after 1954, who controlled many of the rural 
districts, and who had successfully infiltrated the police, 
army, and civil administration. A good description of 
Diem's tactics is provided by William Henderson14 who wrote: 
From the beginning Diem ran his government along 
the lines of a police state. Most manifestations 
of political opposition, whether Communist or 
otherwise, were vigorously suppressed. Civil 
liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal. Elec-
tions were far from free, and many of the devices 
used to stimulate popular support for the regime 
bore the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian 
practice. No doubt these moves could be justified, 
at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelm-
ing problems confronting Diem during his first two 
years in office, and also the inexperience of Free 
Vietnam's people with the forms and substance of 
democracy. But, by the middle of 1956, after two 
years of power, Diem had still to prove that his 
professed devotion to the democratic cause repre-
sented anything more than a facade to disguise the15 
increasing plain reality of stern dictatorship. 
14Assistant Executive Director of the Council on For-
eign Relations, Inc., New York. Mr. Henderson is Far Eastern 
specialist on the Council's permanent staff. 
15william Henderson, "Commentary on Casey, 11 .Viet-Nam: 
~First Five Years, ed., Richard W. Lindholm {Michigan, 
1959), p. 343. 
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The above description of the Diem regime's repressive 
and dictatorial nature provide at least some indications why 
the Buddhist uprising in the summer of 1963 sounded the 
death knell for the Diem government. Diem was powerful, but 
not capable of complete suppression of opposition. The Budd-
hist demonstrations grew increasingly intense and widespread. 
The military leaders were drawn into the anti-Diem rebellion. 
During the last week of August, 1963, Saigon University pro-
fessors and students also joined the demonstrations. Several 
university professors were arrested in August for refusing 
to sign a government loyalty oath. Students boycotted their 
classes in protest. When student unrest continued, the 
Government closed down the university and all secondary 
schools in Saigon. Between 1,000 and 2,000 students were 
arrested for demonstrating and sent to detention camps. 
Nhu's Special Forces units and combat policemen were employed 
in these mass arrests. There was a great deal of criticism 
of the United States for supporting the Diem regime at this 
time. 
In spite of these difficulties a White House statement 
issued October 2, 1963, made it clear that the United States 
leadership fully intended to continue military support of the 
Diem regime. 16 This statement of United States policy in 
16~askin and Fall, p. 128. 
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South Vietnam reiterated the position that "the security of 
South Vietnam is a major interest of the United States as 
other free nations" and predicted that "the major part of 
the United States military task can be completed by the end 
of 1965." It also said that things had progressed to the 
point that 1,000 military personnel on duty in South Vietnam 
could be withdrawn by the end of 1963. The report denied 
that the anti-Government activity in South Vietnam had sig-
nificantly hampered the military effort. 
The coup d'etat itself occurred on November first and 
second, 1963. 17 A civilian-military government assumed of-
fice on November 4, 1963, with ex-Vice President Nguyen Ngoc 
Tho, a Buddhist, as Premier. A Military Revolutionary Coun-
cil under Major General Duong Van Minh's chairmanship was 
formed. This military junta ruled South Vietnam until it 
was replaced in a bloodless coup d'etat on January 30, 1964, 
by Major General Nguyen Khanh, Commander of the Army's First 
Corps. 
The newmilitary leadership of South Vietnam said in a 
military broadcast on November 4, 1963, that "the best weap-
17The chief plotter was Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, a physician 
who had protested in writing to President Diem about Madame 
Nhu's increasing meddling in the political affairs of state. 
After the second letter, Dr. Tran fell out of favor with the 
regime and was in effect 11 exiled11 to Cairo as Consul Gener-
al to get him out of the way. 
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on to fight Communism is democracy and liberty. 1118 The 
new Regime declared it was on the side of the West and that 
it was dedicated to the war against the Communists. The 
head of South Vietnam:' s ruling military committee pledged on 
November 6, 1963, that a democratic government would be set 
up "in the very near future," after the revolutionary regime 
stabilized the situation. 19 
One day after the new Regime had requested recognition 
on November 6, 1963, the United States recognized the pro-
20 
visional government. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said 
in his news conference on November 8, 1963: 
It is our hope that the political and the military 
leadership that has now formed a new government 
there in Vietnam will be able to rally the coun-
try, consolidate the effort, get on with the job, so 
that country can be independent and free and secure. 
He repeated the traditional United States position that: 
As far as the United States is concerned, we do 
not have and have never had any special United 
States interest in terms of military bases or 
anything of that sort. 21 
He said the United States was primari.ly concerned with South 
Vietnam's security and independence. He went on to say there 
18 k . b 5 New Yor Times, Novem er , 1963, p. 12. 
19rbid., November 7, 1963, p. 9. 
20Bulletin, November 25, 1963, p. 818. 
21 b'd I l . I p. 810. 
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would be no problem in South Vietnam 11 if others would leave 
it alone. 11 
Lyndon B. Johnson became Pre.sident of the United States 
on November 22, 1963, upon the assas.sination of President 
John F. Kennedy. In a speech delivered to the Congress on 
November 27, 1963, the new President pledged that his adrnin-
istration would continue to pursue. the policies on Vietnam 
that had been established by President Kennedy. 22 
By December, 1963, however, President Johnson had aband-
oned his pledge and the plans of the Kennedy Administration 
regarding the withdrawal of most of the United States person-
nel from South Vietnam by the end of 1965. 23 These revised 
plans were based on a report made to President Johnson on 
December 21 by Secretary of Defense Ropert s. McNamara after 
returning from a two day fact-finding mission in South Viet-
24 
nam. Secretary McNamara reported that the Viet Cong had 
apparently taken advantage of the disorder which followed 
the coup d'etat on November l and had made new gains. This 
was an important reversal of national.policy, a reversal 
which was to have far reaching effects on the United States 
22rbid., December 16, 1963, p. 910. 
23Raskin and Fall, p. 129. 
24Bulletin, V. 50, January 13, 1964, p. 46. 
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military corrnnitment to South Vietnam. It was more than just 
coincidence that a change in leadership in the United States 
in November, 1963, was followed shortly by a corresponding 
change in leadership in Saigon on January 30, 1964. The 
Johnson Administration was dissatisfied with General Minh's 
prosecution of the war and the role that the United States 
was being forced to play in that conflict. The war was 
being lost in the South, and there was considerable inter-
national pressure at this time for some sort of negotiated 
settlement in Vietnam. 
As previously stated, Major General Nguyen Khanh came 
to power on January 30, 1964. General Khanh charged that 
the Military Revolutionary Council under the leadership of 
Major General Duong Van Minh was involved in a French-led 
plot to neutralize South Vietnam. Indeed, such a plan had 
already been proposed by the French. Charles de Gaulle had 
made the proposal August 29, 1963, that Vietnam (North and 
South) be converted from a divided state at war into a uni-
fied, neutral state that could assume a new role in Asian 
f . 25 a fairs. De Gaulle had said the French would assist Viet-
nam in this venture if it was willing to throw off the for-
eign influence currently being wielded by the United States 
and the Corrnnunist nations. The French proposal had been 
25 New York Times, August 30, 1963, pp. 1-2. 
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turned down by President Kennedy on September 2, 1963, as 
"irrelevant to the current situation in Vietnam. 1126 President 
Kennedy said that as lon~ as the Viet Cong menace existed in 
South Vietnam, such a plan was inconceivable. The proposal 
was again made by President Charles de Gaulle on January 31, 
1964: this time to the effect that the major Western powers 
negotiate with Communist China to neutralize Southeast Asia. 
President De Gaulle said: 
There is in Asia no political reality that 
does not concern or affect China. There is 
neither a war nor a peace imaginable on this 
continent without China's being implicated in 
it. Thus it would be impossible to envisage, 
without China, a possible neutrality agree- 27 
ment relating to the Southeast Asian states. 
In his reply to De Gaulle on February 1, 1964, President 
Johnson said he would be prepared to consider any plan that 
would insure the "neutralization of both North Vietnam and 
South Vietnam." However, he said he saw no evidence of that 
developing at the present time~ 
As long as Communist-inspired unrest in South 
Vietnam persists, I think that the present 
course we are conducting is the only answer, 
and I think that the operations should be 
stepped up there. 28 
Major General Nguyen Khanh was to rule South Vietnam as 
26Bulletin, V. 49, September 30, 1963, p. 498. 
27 k . b 1 1964 1 4 . ~ XQ!:._ Times, Fe ruary , , pp. - . 
. ·, 
. 
28~bid.lt, ~~bruary 2, f964, pp. 1-4. 
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Premier until a civilian g~::>Vernment headed by Tran Van Huong, 
a former mayor of Saigon, assumed office November 5, 1964. 
During these months, the crisis in Vietnam deepened and the 
United States military commitment to the Southern regime in-
creased. Robert Shaplen sums it up very well by saying: 
The year in which General Nguyen Khanh ruled 
Vietnam, for the most part singlehandedly, was 
perhaps the most frustrating and turbulent in 
the experience of the Americans- since they had 
become deep"iy -involved in Vietnamese affairs in 
1954. It was a year in which the United States 
commitment to participate in the war was clearly 
spelled out, by such measures as the naval and air 
bombardment of North Vietnamese bases early in 
August, 1964, in ret-aliation for attacks by 
motor patrol boats; and by the gradual dispatch of 29 
more planes and more American troops to South Vietnam. 
It will suffice at this point to say that the Tonkin 
Gulf incidents of August 2 and 4, 1964, were used to further 
escalate the United States' role in the conflict. At this 
time, as previously stated, the United States leadership 
believed that the war in the South was being lost, and in-
creasingly it was becoming dissatisfied with the total situa-
tion. United States involvement was becoming greater and 
greater primarily because of the increasing political in-
stability of the South Vietnamese regime. It was becoming 
impossible to create a government which to any significant 
29 Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York, 1965), 
p. 235. 
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extent would be acceptable to all the warring and embittered 
factions which were tearing the "nation" apart and rendering 
the United States' military role in Vietnam hopeless. The 
United States initially looked upon these domestic difficul-
ties as Vietnamese problems, to be settled by the Vietnamese 
themselves. However, the situation continued to deteriorate 
an~ the tendency to engage in constant power struggles re-
mained. Under these circumstances it was difficult for the 
United States to ignore the internal problems. Dennis War-
ner stated it this way: 
No new American effort, however, dynamic and dedi-
cated, can have any hope of success without a firm 
assurance of stability at the top Vietnamese poli-
tical and military levels. There must be a mora-
torium on coups, an end to young soldiers' dreams 
of using their guns to win personal power.30 
Jean Lacouture argues that the Khanh coup can be attributed 
in part to the disappointment of United States leadership 
with the Minh junta's prosecution of the War. 
The officers on General Harkins' staff, began 
to look for candidates and to sound out the 
malcontents. Two of these emerged above all 
the others: Generals Nguyen Khanh and Duong Van 31 Due. 
The United States press had also taken note of the lack of 
trust General Harkins had for the junta and speculated that 
30Dennis Warner, "Vietnam: The Awful Choice", The Re-
porter, XXX, February 27, 1964, p. 27. 
31 Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces (New 
York, 1966), p. 131. 
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General Minh might soon be replaced by someone more accept-
32 
able. Recalling the White House statement on October 2, 
1963, in which Secretary of Defense Robert s. McNamara an-
nounced the withdrawal of most of the United States troops 
from South Vietnam by the end of 1965, 33 the first indica-
tion to the United States public of a change in official 
thinking came in a letter from President Lyndon Johnson to 
Duong Van Minh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Coun-
cil, on December 31, 1963. The President promised "the 
fullest measure of support in this bitter fight." The let-
ter went on to declare: "We shall maintain in Vietnam Ameri-
can personnel and material as needed to assist you in achiev-
ing victory. 1134 Three days before the Khanh coup d'etat, 
Secretary Robert S. McNamara, testifying before the House 
Armed Services Committee, said: 
The survival of an independent government in South 
Vietnam is so important to the security of Southeast 
Asia and to the free world that I can conceive of no 
alternfitive other than to take all necessary measures 35 
within our capability to prevent a Communist victory. 
32New ~Times, January 15, 1964, p. 6. 
33Raskin and Fall, p. 128. 
34Bulletin, V. 50, January 27, 1964, p. 122. 
35Franz Schurmann, ~eter Dale Scott and Reginald Zel-
nik, eds., The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam (Greenwich, 
Conn., 1966), p. 33. 
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Franz Schurmann, in discussing Secretary McNamara's 
testimony, failed to point out in his book that Secretary 
McNamara also stated before this committee that he still be-
lieved that most of the 15,500 American troops on duty in 
South Vietnam could be withdrawn by the end of 1965. 36 Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk announced in his press conference 
on January 2, 1964, however, that ' ,•, 
'i' 
A Vietnamese Army group seized in the delta 
area of Vietnam some 300,000 rounds 'of small 
arms .ammunition, made in China and tliat with-
out question Hanoi was primarily responsible37 
for their infiltration into South Vietnam. 
That North Vietnam was supporting the puerrillas in South 
I 
' 
Vietnam was no more a secret than the fact that the United 
States was supporting the South Vietnamese government against 
them. So, the situation in Washington in 1964 became as con-
fusing as the situation in Vietnam. On the one hand, Uni-
ted States leadership was talking about withdrawing; while 
on the other (in talking about the deteriorating political 
situation in Saigon and how Hanoi was assisting the Viet 
Cong), they were building a strong case for staying. 
Secretary of Defense Robert s. McNamara and General Max-
well D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re-
ported on the conclusion of a five day inspection trip to 
36New York Times, February 19, 1964, pp. 1-8. 
37Bulletin, January 20, 1964, p. 81. 
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South Vietnam, March 8-12, 1964, that there had "unquestion-
ably been setbacks" in the war effort. They said, "the Viet 
Cong have taken maximum advantage of two changes of govern-
ment, and of more longstanding difficulties" to make new 
gains. The White House statement continued: 
The supply of arms and cadres from the North has 
continued; careful and sophisticated control of 
Viet Cong .operations has been apparent; and evi-
dence that such control is centered in Hanoi is 
clear and unmistakable. 38 
So, United States leadership finding itself inextricably in-
valved in a civil conflict was building a case for charging 
North Vietnam with aggression. Perhaps the United States 
built such an air-tight case that it lost all of its options. 
In a major policy speech on March 26, 1964, McNamara 
reinforced the case for external aggression and warned that 
"the situation in South Vietnam has unquestionably worsened, 
at least since last fall." He further reported an estimated 
"20,000 to 25,000 'hard core' Viet Cong guerrillas ... " in 
South Vietnam and said they had been able "to recruit from 
among the South Vietnamese an irregular force of from 60,000 
to 80,000. 1139 The secretary candidly admitted that the war 
there might not be finished "in the first thousand days of 
the Johnson Administration." It was announced on March 29, 
38rbid., April 6, 1964. 
39rbid., April 13, 1964, pp. 562-570. 
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1964, that the United States would provide South Vietnam 
with $50 million annually to finance expansion of its armed 
40 forces by 50,000 men. This would be in addition to the 
then current assistance of $500 million annually. 
United States leadership made it very clear, almost 
from the moment that General Nguyen Khanh had seized power, 
that it was ready to back him fully in his efforts to sus-
tain a govern.J11ent and conduct a war against the Viet Cong. 
The chief architect of this policy of complete military and 
financial support of General Khanh's dreams of being the man 
who saved Vietnam from the Conununists seems to have been 
McNamara. To many, by this time, the war had become "McNa-
mara' s war,'' but the Secretary in his public statements 
simply ignored these attacks upon his policy. The addition-
al aid from the United States would be used to finance 
General Khanh's efforts to save South Vietnam from the Com-
munists,. as he stated it. These multifarious plans revolved 
around two basic principles: (1) the mobilization of able-
bodied citizens to perform some of the para-military tasks 
which were essential to the successful conduct of the war 
and (2) a continuation and improvement of the strategic ham-
let's program. This, it should be remembered, was South 
40 New X2IJ:s. Times, March 30, 1964, pp. 1-7. 
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Vietnam's first long-range counteroffensive against the Viet 
Cong, called Operation Sunrise. It was launched March 22, 
1964, in Binh Duong Province, thirty-five miles north of 
Saigon. 
General Nguyen Khanh also had plans to bring the Civil 
Guard, ~hich was the provincial or regional force, up to 
full st+ength and assimilate it into the regular army. The 
Civil Guard was about twenty per cent under its authorized 
strength of eighty thousand. These plans also involved mer-
ging the village Self-Defense Corps with the Combat Youth 
for the purpose of defending the strategic hamlets. The 
Self-Defense Corps also would be brought up to its alloted 
strength of seventy-two thousand men. General Khanh in addi-
tion had developed plans to train young army officers to 
take over as chiefs of 237 districts in the country and be 
in charge of the 11 holding 11 part of the new "clear and hold" 
military plan. He realized the difficulties he would have 
in implementing these plans and recognized them in his new 
"Program of Action, 11 proclaimed in mid-March, 1964. He said 
that Diem oppression and Viet Cong pressure had brought 
things to a point that "the people kept more and more away 
from the government, were no longer interested in fighting 
f . 1 d d 11 h. 'h' l · .tH or surv1va , an were gra ua y approac 1ng ann1 1 at1on. 
41 Shaplen, p. 238. 
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General ~hanh's new program impressed the United States. 
Military and economic aid to the regime was increased, and 
Secretary McNamara clearly endorsed his leadership. The 
situation in South Vietnam, however, continued to deterio-
rate, and the Khanh regime soon demonstrated its inability 
to cope with the series of political crises that began in 
South Vietnqm in the summer of 1964. There was constant talk 
of coups in Sqigon. This can be explained by the fact that 
under President Diem's rule freedom of expression had not 
been allowed for nine years. Anyone who disagreed with Diem 
and his ruling family was branded a traitor. When Diem fell, 
so did most of the oppressive rules and regulations pertain-
ing to freedom of expression and the press. This newly 
found freedom of expression became a~ame; no one understood 
the rules of cfemocracy, but everyone wanted to participate. 
In an attempt to quell the rising discontent, General 
Khanh in mid-July attempted to rally the nation by advocating 
an attack on North Vietnam. A bac-tien or "march to the 
North," became the slogan of the day. This was not yet Uni-
ted States policy. However, Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 
Manila at the tenth annual meeting of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization in April had said the United States did 
not rule out the possibility of extending the conflict to 
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h . 42 Nort Vietnam. This announcement by Khanh brought him 
into sharp conflict with Ambassador Maxwell Taylor who had 
replaced Henry Cabot Lodge on June 23. 
In July, 1964, an additional 5,000 American troops were 
sent to South Vietnam, raising the total United States for-
ces there to 25,000. General.Nguyen Khanh however, needed 
more than this to shore up his shaky position. Nothing was 
going right for him. He had yet to score one significant 
military victory over the Viet Cong, and the results of his 
attempt to meet the social and political challenge which 
faced his regime were far from satisfactory. In his attempt 
to gain support from the people for himself and his govern-
ment, he had opened the door to all of the dissidents and 
radical elements in the country. His only hope now was that 
the United States might take a more active role in the con-
flict. 
The opportunity that General Khanh had been waiting for 
came on August 2, 1964, in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast 
of North Vietnam. It has since been referred to as the Ton-
kin Gulf incidents of August 2 and 4, 1964. United States 
leadership has never adequately explained the events that 
made up these ~ncidents. The result was clear, however. 
It led to the bombardment of North Vietnamese coastal defen-
42 New York Times, April 14, 1964, p. 3. 
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ses by United States aircraft on August 5, 1964. This born-
bardment, the first overt attack by the United States on 
North Vietnam, constituted a basic change in the Johnson 
administration's Vietnam policy by making the United States 
a direct combatant on a signif1icant scale. The Tonkin Gulf 
incidents and the immediate United States response, in turn, 
led to the passage of Senate Joint Resolution 189 on August 
7, 1964, approving and supporting ... 
The determination of the President ... to take 
all necessary measures to repel any armed at-
tack agaiqst the forces of the United States 
and to pr~vent further aggression. 43 
That document, known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, called 
the incid,ents "part of a deliberate and systematic campaign 
of aggression" by North Vietnam, and became the primary le-
gal and political basis of United States participation in the 
conflict. It was also stated in this Resolution that "the 
maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast 
Asia" was considered vital to the national interest of the 
United States. 
The United States Congress approved by an almost unanim-
ous vote the Tonkin Gulf Resolution--the House of Represen-
tatives by a vote of 416 - 0, the Senate by a 88 - 2 vote. 
It is interesting to note that the two dissenting votes in 
43Bulletin, V. 51, August 24, 1964, p. 268. 
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the Senate were cast by Senators Wayne L. Morse and Ernest 
Gruening. Senator Morse in the Senate debate over the pro-
posed Resolution said that such a Resolution was unconstitu-
44 
tional because it was "a predated declaration of war power." 
Senator Morse also said on August 5, 1964, that the United 
States was as responsible for the Tonkin Gulf crisis as 
45 North Vietnam was. As a matter of historical record, it 
should be stated that North Vietnam did not deny--in fact, 
it confirmed--the August 2, 1964, episode; but it has always 
emphatica+ly depied the August 4 episode which led directly 
to the reprisal raids and the August 7, 1964, Congressional 
Resolution. The only evidence that the United States could 
muster in proof of the August 4 episode was one bullet im-
bedded in the hull of a destroyer. 
With the p~ssage of Senate Joint Resolution 189 on Aug-
ust 7, 1964, the United States political and military com-
mitment to South Vietnam was complete. The Tonkin Gulf in-
cidents and the United States raids which responded to them 
marked the beginning of a transformation of the United States 
role in Vietnam. The United States troop buildup--to more 
than 500,000 men--and the air war against North Vietnam can 
44u. s., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1964, ex, Part 14, 18133. 
45New York Times, August 6, 1964, p. 8. 
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be traced to that engagement. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
was used Qy United States leadership to justify the February 
7, 1965, air attacks on North Vietnamese territory by car-
rier-based United States aircraft. 46 
According to the official United States version of the 
Tonkin Gulf incidents, on August 2, and again on August 4, 
1964, United Stqtes naval vessels, operating in internation-
al waters in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Viet-
nam,were attacked without provocation by three North Viet-
namese torpedo ~oats. When Secretary McNamara testified 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Conunittee on August 6, 
1964, he insisted that the 11 DeSoto 11 operations47 were rou-
tine. A study prepared by the staff .of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Conunittee in February, 1968, asserted, however, 
that the destroyer u.s.s. Maddox was under orders in August, 
1964, to take provocative action to induce the Chinese Com-
munists and North Vietnam to turn on their radio and radar 
equipment so the destroyer could monitor them. 48 According 
to the staff study, the u.s.s. Maddox, which had gone on 
46Ibid., February 8, 1965, p. 14. 
4711 pesoto 11 was the code name given to the operational 
maneuvers that the u.s.s. Maddox and another United States 
destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, were engaged in. 
48New ~Times, February 22, 1968, p. 15. 
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patrol on July 28, 1964, was under orders from the Comrnander-
in-Chief of United States forces in the Pacific "to stimulate 
Chicom/North Vietnamese electronic reaction." The staff 
study also revealed that the u.s.s. Maddox had encountered 
technical difficulties with its sonar shortly before detect-
ing what it thought to be an attack by North Vietnamese tor-
pedo boats. This disclosure raised further questions about 
the reliability of the evidence on which the Administration 
based its conclusion that the u.s.s. Maddox and the C. Tur-
ner Joy had come under North Vietnamese attack the night of 
August 4, 1964. The committee staff, which had access to 
the messages sent and received by the u.s.s. Maddox found 
no subsequent message from the destroyer reporting that the 
technical difficulty had been corrected, nor did the staff 
study show that during the attack higher authorities had 
sent any messages to the u.s.s. Maddox inquiring about the 
state of repair of the sonar. 49 
These United States vessels were on patrol in Tonkin 
Bay while South Vietnamese warships were bombarding two 
Northern coastal islands, Hon Me and Hon Nieu on July 30 
and 31, 1964, and again on the nights of August 3 and 4. 
Secretary McNamara's testimony in August, 1964, which denied 
United States involvement with the South Vietnamese against 
49Ibid., February 4, 1968, p. 3. 
the North Vietnamese raises questions about accuracy. He 
testified then: 
Our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not 
associated with, was not aware of, any South Viet-
namese actions against the North Vietnamese is- 50 
lands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu, if there were any. 
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The staff study revealed that the United States Navy pro-
vided the advice, crew training, and the vessels for these 
South Vietncµnese raiding operations, known as 34-A. The 
operations were set up in February, 1964, by South Vietnam 
51 
and the United States Military Advisory Group. The "De-
Soto" operations under these circumstances hardly seem rou-
tine. None of this was revealed until the February, 1968, 
Senate Foreign Re:J_ations Committee Hearings on the Tonkin 
Gulf incident. During these Hearings, Secretary McNamara 
for the first time told the Committee that the two United 
States destroyers were on intelligence missions. He still 
insisted, however, that the patrols were routine. This rev-
elation prompted Senator Wayne Morse to say: 
l:Ie calls it a "routine patrol, 11 the Maddox was 
a spy ship under instruction to stimulate the 
electronic instruments of North Vietnam to 
carry out a spying activity. This is not a 
routine patrol for a destroyer ... The United 
States was a provocateur in the Gulf of Ton- 52 
kin on August 4, 1964, and history will so record. 
50rbid., August 6, 1964, p. 6. 
51rbid., February 22, 1968, p. 15. 
52Ibid. 
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According to the North Vietnamese version of the inci-
dent which occurred on August 2, 1964, the U.S.S. Maddox 
had penetrated North Vietnamese territorial waters, and this 
was the reason for the attack. Like many other nations, 
North Vietnam recognizes a twelve-mile territorial limit 
rather than the three-mile limit favored by nations with 
larger navies. It was officially stated by United States 
leadership that the U .. SoS. Maddox "went in at least eleven 
miles in order to show that we do not recognize a twelve-
mile limit. 1153 Secretary McNamara testified during the 
February, 1968, Hearings that at no time prior to the August, 
1964, Tonkin Gulf incidents did the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment claim a width of territorial sea in excess of three 
miles. He said that no such claim would be assumed unless 
specifically made and published. The Secretary testified 
that North Vietnam made no such claim until September l, 
1964, when it was announced over Radio Hanoi. 54 
The United States version of an 11 unprovoked 11 attack is 
somewhat dubious. It is difficult to believe that three 
small torpedo boats would attack a United States destroyer 
53u. s., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1964, ex, Part 14, 18407. 
54rt should be remembered in this connection that the 
United States claims another nine miles as "contiguous 
waters" in which it can enforce its law on foreign ships. 
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operating in international waters without provocation. When 
it was revealed that the United States warships were at the 
time operating within the twelve-mile limit claimed by North 
Vietnam, Senator Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee confirmed this and added, in speak-
ing about the August 2 incident: 
Our vessels had turned away from the North Viet-
namese shore and were making for the middle of 
the gulf, where the.re would be no question, at55 
the time they were attacked on August 2, 1964. 
Evidently, there WqS some concern about the legal position 
of the United States. 
The Pentagon, when questioned about the August 2 inci-
dent, remarked in an official statement that the situation 
was "µnwelcome, but not especially serious. 1156 However, the 
raids of August 4 apd 5, 1964, which hit seven targets in 
the·Bay of Along at Vinh, eliminated half of North Vietnam's 
naval force, while the United States sustained only light 
losses--three planes and one pilot. The United States flew 
sixty-four bombing sorties over North Vietnamese territory, 
destroying or damaging twenty-five North Vietnamese torpedo 
boats and an oil depot. This attack, in reprisal, patently 
altered the United States commitment. The United States in 
55Raskin and Fall, p. 312. 
56New York Times, August 3, 1964, p. 6. 
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two days had escalated the conflict on a grand scale. En-
gagernent in the conflict was now direct, extending beyond 
the boundaries of South Vietnam, and the precedent had been 
established which would lead to further bombing raids on 
North Vietnamese territory which began on February 7, 1965. 
These raids of August 4 and 5, 1964, the United States 
claimed, were carried out in reprisal for the unprovoked 
attacks on United States warships on August 2 and again on 
August 4. Even if the attacks on the warships were without 
provocation, as the United States claimed, the reprisal 
raids were out of all proportion to the damage suffered by 
United States ships. Indeed, the United States sustained 
heavier losses in carrying out the reprisal raids than it 
had in the claimed North Vietnamese attacks which supposedly 
triggered the raids. The United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, told the Security Council 
in April of 1964 in reference to another incident that: 
My government has repeatedly expressed its 
emphatic disapproval of provocative acts 
and of retaliatory raids wherever they oc-57 
cur and by whomever they are committed. 
Current doctrine, moreover, entirely rejects the theory 
of retaliation which, at certain periods in history, was a 
prerogative of the great powers. In his book, Theory and 
57united Nations, Securitv Council Official Records 
(Security Council Meeting 1108, April 6, 1964), p. 13. 
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Reality in Public International Law, the Belgian jurist, 
Charles de Visscher, who was a member of the International 
Court of Justice, said: 
In fact, resort to armed reprisals was a matter 
of pure political opportunism, for it depended 
essentially on the existing balance of strength. 
Reprisals were par excellence the arm of the strong 
against the weak. The states resorting to them 
were those powerful enough not to fear a riposte 
that might lead to war. 58 
The reprisal raids carried out by the United States made 
President Johnson look a little less than the champion of 
world law and order he proclaimed himself to be. 
General Khanh, needless to say, welcomed the reprisal 
raids. He had, upon several occasions, called for such 
raids upon North Vietnamese territory. Such raids, he be-
lieved, would serve a dual purpose.. They would strengthen 
his position as the head of the South Vietnamese government 
and prove to Hanoi and Peking that the United States was 
willing to support him with military force. He declared a 
nationwide state of emergency on August 7, 1964, to cope 
with what he called increasing pressures from Communist 
China and North Vietnam following the United States reprisal 
raids. A strict curfew was imposed in Saigon; strikes and 
public meetings were temporarily banned, and censorship of 
58charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public In-
ternational Law (Princeton, 1957), p. 288. 
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the press was imposed. Indeed, Premier Khanh believed that 
his position was so secure that on August 15, 1964, he at-
tempted to seize all civilian and military power. He impos-
ed his own constitution which would in effect have given him 
complete control over the s,tate. General Minh was ousted 
as chief of state, and the po.st was abolished. The office 
of premier was also elim_inated and Premier Khanh became 
President of South Vietnam on August 16, .1964, under the 
new Constitution which provided for a strong presidential 
system. This assumption of wider powers and the repressive 
August 7, 1964, emergency decrees, however, brought about a 
great wave of mass movements that forced General Khanh and 
his government to resign on August 25, 1964. At this time, 
he promised to return all power to the civilians, which he 
did on October 27, 1964. General Nguyen Khanh had tried to 
move too rapidly, and the salutary effect that the United 
States raids had in bolstering his government at a time 
when he needed it most was short-lived. 
Whether the August 4, 1964, Tonkin Gulf incident was 
provoked by the North Vietnamese, as United States leader-
ship testified it was, or prefabricated by the United 
States, as North Vietnam claimed, is not within the scope of 
this study to determine. It is apparent, however, that the 
August 4 incident served as the rationale for the retalia-
tory raids upon North Vietnamese territory. These raids es-
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calated the conflict on a significant scale, and, in turn, 
led to the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 
7, 1964, which solidified the United States military conunit-
ment to the South Vietnamese gove.rnment. Further escalation 
of the conflict was not inevitable. The United States mili-
tary conuni tment and partic.ipation .in the conflict increased 
until it became, as Senator Mike Mansfield f,eared in 1963, 
"of greater concern and greater responsibility to the United 
States than it is to the government and people.of South 
Vietnam. 1159 The Tonkin Gulf Resolution inevitably led to 
the conversion of the conflict into a war fought primarily 
with United States combat troops. 
59 Seep. 3, Chapter IV. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
United States concern for its security interests in Asia 
and the Pacific area soon after the demise of Chiang Kai-shek · 
and the Korean War turned to Southeast Asia and particularly 
Vietnam. There the French Expeditionary Corps was engaged 
in a steadily deteriorating conflict with the nationalist 
forces of Ho Chi Minh. United States leadership believed 
that, if the French were defeated, the vacuum thus created 
would be filled by the Communists and that Vietnam could then 
be used as a stepping-stone for the military penetration of 
the American def~nsive perimeter ip Asia. 
For this reason, the United States believed it necessary 
to make a commitment to the maintenance and stability of the 
.. 
,. " 
French supported regime in Vietnam. To accomplish its in,-
tended purpose, the United States began in the spring of 
1950 to extend vast amounts of military and economic aid to 
the French in Vietnam. By 1954, the United States had ex-
pended approximately 1.5 billion dollars for this purpose. 
Also during this period, a limited number of economic and 
military advisors were made available to the French and Viet-
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namese leadership. This limited aid and advice did not ac-
complish its intended purpose, however, for the French posi-
tion continued to deteriorate. It is evident that through-
out this period (1950-1954) United States leadership 
believed that through a limited commitment of economic and 
military aid French hegemony could be restored to its former 
position in Vietnam. 
By 1954 it was clear that the French were going to be 
defeated. On May 8 the French jungle fortress of Dienbien-
phu surrendered to the forces of General Vo Nguyen Giap. 
Simultaneously the Geneva Conference, which had opened in 
April, 1954, was considering the difficult and complex Indo-
Chinese question. At Geneva, it was decided to divide Viet-
nam into two regroupment areas, roughly along the 17th Paral-
lel. The Northern section would be reserved for the Viet 
Minh, while the "pro-French" forces would gather in the 
South. National elections, under the supervision of an In-
ternational Control Commission, were to be held no later 
than July 21, 1956, to reunite the state under one govern-
ment. 
This settlement was opposed by the United States. The 
United States regarded the Final Settlement as a diplomatic 
victory for Ho Chi Minh, and indeed it was. The United 
States at Geneva sought to prevent any further extension of 
Communist influence in Vietnam; however, it failed to do this. 
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It was certain that when national elections were held in 
1956 Ho Chi Minh would win easily. The United States did, 
however, on the last day of the Conference, issue a Unilater-
al Declaration in which it pledged to "do nothing which would 
disturp the provisions of the Accords." 
I 
The Final Settlement negotiated at Geneva was a realis-
tic one. Considering the drastic turn the War had taken for 
the French, a military compromise which would permit the 
French to gracefully withdraw was the only possible solution. 
The United States and South Vietnam, by opposing this solu-
tion, contributed to the problem from which United States 
leadership is now trying to extricate itself. The United 
States moved rapidly to strengthen the Diem regime and the 
South Vietnamese economy in order that it might successfplly 
maintain itself vis-a-vis the Communists. This was consis-
tent with its policy of containment of Communist influence 
throughout the world. 
The problem for the United States, however, involved 
much more than simply pouring in vast amounts of economic, 
technical, and military aid. The United States had made a 
commitment to the support and survival of a regime which 
lacked popular support. Nationalism had become a strong 
force in Vietnam, but Diem lacked broad popular support and 
confidence because he was considered to be a puppet of Uni-
ted States l~adership. The United States underestimated the 
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strengtp of nationalist sentiment under the inspiration and 
leadership of Ho Chi Minh. The fact that Ho Chi Minh was a 
Communist blinded the United States to the realities of the 
Vietnamese political environment. The result was a futile 
effort to sustain a leadership that had little chance of 
succeeding against a strong nationalist movement under very 
capable leadership. 
The French had not constructed a viable administrative 
structure nor had they permitted an effective and compatable 
political groµp to come into existence. The United States 
attempted to puild a viable political regime in an environ-
ment committed to a nationalist leadership antagonistic to 
the United States. It attempted to sustain a leadership with 
only limited nationalist appeal. The Diem regime's corrup-
tion and narrow base limited its capacity to expand its writ 
throughout Vietnam. The Communists were able to acquire 
popular sup~o+t to prosecute an effective stand against the 
Diem regime. The United States was constantly confronted 
with a weak government capable of only a meager military ef-
fort. As the Communists stepped up the campaign, these 
weaknesses turned into defects, and the United States invol-
vement wa.s increased to prevent total collapse. 
The Comm~nists, however, did not pose a real threat to 
the staQility of the Diem regime until the July 1956 election 
deadline had passed. The refusal of the Diem regime, with 
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the support of the United States, to hold the elections led 
to the intensification of the military effort of the South 
Vietnamese Co1'11unists against the Saigon government. The 
Diem regime was not only confronted with internal political 
difficulties but the security of the regime was threatened 
by antagonistic internal guerrilla forces morally supported 
by external powers. These events compelled United States 
leadership gradually to shift from a policy of aid and ad-
vice to a military and political corrunitment in South Vietnam. 
This political and military corrunitment intensified as the 
internal and external difficulties of South Vietnam increas-
ed. The United States corrunitment, therefore, increased as 
South Vietnam ~as unable to cope with its internal security. 
This comrp.itment forced the United States to provide tpe lead-
ership in the military contest and to determine the form of 
the political order in South Vietnam, including the selection 
of the political leadership. 
In 1964, the United States realized that the conflict 
in the South was being lost and the regime it was backing in 
Saigon was on the verge of collapse. Since some semblance 
of political stability in Saigon was essential to the suc-
cessful waging of the conflict, the United States attempted 
unsuccessfully to put General Nguyen Khanh in a stronger 
position vis-a-vis the internal political forces in South 
Vietnam by extending the conflict to the North. This action 
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did not stabilize the Khanh regime, however, and it was 
replaced within two months. The increasing involvement of 
the United States in the struggle led to the direct involve-
ment of the North Vietnamese in the war. 
After 1964 United States involvement in Vietnam was one 
of rapidly increasing cost and corrunitment. On February 7, 
1965, the United States began to bomb North Vietnam. When 
this did not succeed in changing the course of the war, Pres-
ident Johnson ordered a vast increase--from about 21,000 to 
over 140,000--in United States troop strength in South Viet-
nam and a vigorous prosecution of the land war. The United 
States was now inextricably involved in the war. 
The United States became deeply involved and entangled 
in the conflict because initially it had misinterpreted the 
political environment, had underestimated the strength of 
the Corrununist opposition, and had been overly sanguine about 
the prospects of building a viable regime in the South. This 
led the United States to make many costly miscalculations, 
to further intensification of its involvement. 
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